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Knowledge would be fatal,
it is the uncertainty that charms one.
A mist makes things beautiful.
Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, 1891
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Over the past decades, researchers have investigated the psychology of
judgment and decision making. Counterintuitive findings, profound insights,
and practical prescriptions regarding the means by which individuals, groups
and organizations make decisions have been offered. A lot of effort has been
made to model the cognitive process of a rational man. Such models are
used to describe why and how decisions are made (i.e., a descriptive model),
to prescribe how people will behave (i.e., a prescriptive model), and to state
how people should behave in some ideal sense (i.e., a normative model).
Moreover, judgment and decision making research is often conducted with
practical questions and with an implicit or explicit concern with the ways in
which judgments and decisions might be improved. According to normative
theories of decision making, good decision makers need a composite of skills,
including the ability to make coherent risk judgments, to resist sunk-cost in-
vestments that are no longer profitable, and to be appropriately confident in
their knowledge. Behavioral decision researchers study how these decisions
are made, traditionally focusing on deviations from normative standards.
Because most of these decision errors have been found in seemingly unre-
alistic hypothetical decisions without real-world consequences, some recent
research has questioned the external validity of this work (Gigerenzer et al.,
1999) and sought more realistic accounts of how people master the skills
needed for effective decision making (Baron, 2000; McFadden et al., 2000).
This work tries to explore the decision making behavior of market partici-
pants and highlights the importance of a whole collection of methods that
decision makers use. The adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) and the
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adaptive decision maker (Payne et al., 1993) approaches see decision making
as the result of a balance between individual resources and task character-
istics. The work presented is a view of the decision maker as an individual
who, to use strategies adaptively, has to consider the structure of decision
environments as well as personal limitations. Specifically, we firstly identi-
fied four different situations in which bankers face uncertainties, and then —
through the analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted in two leading
investment and central banks — we explore the ways of coping with uncer-
tainty used by financial practitioners. A multitude of coping ways beyond
probabilistic reasoning are identified; and their functionality and adaptive
use are discussed. The results suggest that expert individuals beside the
use of a scientific approach, are confident in using analogies, constructing
narratives, developing theory of mind of others, and choosing their own level
of reasoning. The study also provides empirical evidence that bankers use
their tools adaptively, trying to pick the right tool for the right job.
The work is organized as follows. In chapters 2 and 3 we give an overview of
the problem under study discussing some core concepts as theoretical bases
of our inquiry. Chapter 4 includes the main research hypotheses, the qual-
itative method we used and the presentation of the empirical results. In
Chapter 5 we organize and analyze the empirical results. In Chapter 6 and
7 a discussion and a general conclusion complete the work. Please note, an




This research uses the bounded rationality approach, which explores how
organisms with limited time, information, and computational abilities make
adaptive decisions. When all of the facts, i.e. options, consequences, and
probabilities, bearing on a decision are accurately known beforehand — when
the decision is made under "certainty"— careless thinking or excessive com-
putational difficulty are the only reasons why the decision should turn out,
after the fact, to have been wrong. But when the relevant facts are not all
known — when the decision is made under "uncertainty"— it is impossible
to make sure that every decision will turn out to have been right. In a very
general sense, uncertainty in human behaviors stems from incompleteness of
the knowledge necessary to forecast future events, undertake any one course
of action and control its results (Dosi & Egidi, 1991). So, assumptions about
rationality of human beings result to be an important issue to explain hu-
man behavior and many other social phenomena. In this chapter we present
the main literature regarding the study of human rationality, stressing the
philosophic, psychologic and economic passage from unbounded to bounded
rationality and all intermediate steps.
2.1 The idea of rational choice
In Economics rationality can be analyzed in terms of preferences, pro-
cess and outcomes. Rational choice theory has tried to explain preference
and choice by assuming that people are rational choosers (von Neumann &
Morgenstern, 1944). According to the rational choice framework, human be-
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ings have well-ordered preferences. The idea is that people have complete
information about the costs and benefits associated with each option. They
compare the options with one another on a single scale of preference, or
value, or utility. And after making the comparisons, people choose so as to
maximize their preferences, or values, or utilities.
Formally, let X be a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. Economic agents
are assumed to have preferences, denoted by , on this set X:
x  y means "x is at least as good as y".
The preference relation  is called rational if it satisfies the following two
properties:
1. Completeness: For all x, y ∈ X, x  y or y  x
2. Transitivity : For all x, y, z ∈ X, x  y and y  z implies x  z
2.2 Rethinking Rationality
In the early 1950’s the idea of humans as rational and narrowly self-
interested actors attempted to maximize their own personal function started
to decline. Critiques of the rational tradition began to appear as scholars
realized that man were not capable of making decisions which took into
account all possible alternatives, assessed all possible outcomes, and selected
the optimal among such alternatives.
"Broadly stated, the task is to replace the global rationality of the
economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible
with the access to information and the computational capacities
that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the
kinds of environments in which such organisms exist."(H. A. Si-
mon, 1955, p.99)
Preoccupation with the rational emerged. This view saw that
"[...] decision is a deliberate act of selection by the mind, of
an alternative from a set of competing alternatives in the hope,
expectation or belief that the actions envisioned in carrying out
the selected alternative will accomplish certain goals "(Fishburn,
1972, p.19)
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In his epoch-making book Administrative Behavior, Herbert Simon argues
that there is not one kind of rationality, but in fact different kinds of ra-
tionality such as "objective rationality", i.e. the rationality of maximizing
given values in a given situation, "subjective rationality", i.e. the rational-
ity of maximizing attainment relative to the subjects’s knowledge, conscious
rationality, and deliberate rationality (H. Simon, 1947, p.84-85). In later
research, Simon coined the terms substantive rationality and procedural ra-
tionality. The former one, object of economists’ attention, "is appropriate to
the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions
and constraints"(H. A. Simon, 1976, p.130); while the latter one , object of
psychologists’ attention, is about the rationality of the procedure used to
reach a decision. In analogy with H. Simon’s distinction between substan-
tive and procedural rationality, Dosi & Egidi (1991) argued that individuals
are subjected to substantive and procedural uncertainty. Substantive uncer-
tainty is related to lack of information about environmental events, whereas
procedural uncertainty concerns the competence gap in problem solving de-
fined by the economist Heiner (1983) as the "C-D gap"in terms of difficulties
of the agents to map information into the true events. These forms of uncer-
tainty limit the computational rationality of agents and consequently lead
them to develop routines and decision rules that could reduce the procedural
uncertainty. Although the science of economics has historically depended on
the tenets of rational choice theory, it is now well established that many of
the psychological assumptions underlying rational choice theory are unreal-
istic and that human beings routinely violate the principles of rational choice
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). In particular, modern behavioral eco-
nomics has acknowledged that the assumption of complete information that
characterizes rational choice theory is implausible. Rather than assuming
that people possess all the relevant information for making choices, choice
theorists treat information itself as a "commodity", something that has a
price (in time or money), and is thus a candidate for consumption along
with more traditional goods (Payne et al., 1993).
2.3 Visions of Human Rationality
Historically, researchers have long been concerned with questions of hu-
man rationality: how individuals reach a decision — thus, issues of thought,
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reasoning and computation. The concept of bounded rationality, which
arises naturally when thinking about procedural rationality and is inextri-
cably linked with the concept of human rationality, has been the subject of
much recent investigation in economic theory. Here, I illustrate four differ-
ent conceptions of rationality elaborated by Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC
Research Group in 1999. On one side, models of unbounded rationality
wonder about how humans with perfect information and all the eternity at
their disposal—human mind has essentially unlimited demonic or supernat-
ural reasoning power—would behave; on the other side, models of bounded
rationality try to understand how humans with limited time and knowledge
behave. In turns, two species of demons are distinguished those that exhibit
unbounded rationality, and those that optimize under constraints. There
are also two main forms of bounded rationality: satisficing heuristics for
searching through a sequence of available alternatives, and fast and frugal
heuristics that use little information and computation to make a variety of
kinds of decisions1 (See Figure 1).
Figure 1: Visions of Rationality. Figure from Gigerenzer et al., 1999, p.7
Unbounded Rationality
The heavenly ideal of perfect knowledge provides the gold standard for
many ideals of rationality. In models of unbounded rationality all relevant
information is assumed to be freely available to everyone, that is there is no
1To be fair, this vision of human rationality has been developed in 1999. In the mean-
while several studies conducted by the same main author consider satisficing a category
belonging to fast and frugal heuristics, e.g.(Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2011).
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regard for the constraints of time, knowledge, and computational capacities
that real humans face. Pierre-Simon Laplace created a fictional being known
as Laplace’s superintelligence or demon, characterized as follows
Given [...] an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces
by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the
beings who compose it — an intelligence sufficiently vast to sub-
mit these data to analysis [...] nothing would be uncertain and
the future as the past, would be present to its eyes. (Laplace,
1951, p.4)
On one hand, proponents of unbounded rationality generally acknowledge
that their models assume unrealistic mental abilities accepting the difference
between God, or Laplace’s superintelligence, and mere mortals. Unlike the
demon, unboundedly rational beings make errors. In particular it is assumed
that they can find the optimal strategy, that is, the one that maximizes some
criterion (such as correct predictions, monetary gains, or happiness) and min-
imizes error. A strategy for solving a problem is defined optimal if there is
no better strategy (although there can be equally good ones). Humans must
make inferences from behind a veil of uncertainty, but God sees clearly; the
currency of human thought is probabilities, whereas God deals in certitude.
On the other hand, when it comes to how they think these uncertain infer-
ences are executed, those who believe in unbounded rationality paint humans
in God’s image. God and Laplace’s superintelligence do not worry about lim-
ited time, knowledge, or computational capacities. For example, unbounded
rationality encompasses models that seek to maximize the expected value or
utility2 or perform the Bayesian calculations that assume demonic strength
to tackle real-words problems. Because of the lack of psychological realism,
theories that assume unboundedly rationality are often called as-if theories.
Due to its unnaturalness, unbounded rationality has come under attack in
the second half of the twentieth century.
2According to Payne et al. (1993) the expected value rule and expected utility rule are
the normative rules for choices. Both strategies work as a weighted additive (WADD) rule
developing an overall evaluation of an alternative multiplying the weight time the attribute
value, the value (i.e. monetary amount) or the utility respectively, for each attribute and
summing these weighted attribute values over all attributes.
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Optimization Under Constraints
Based on the more realistic existence of constraints in the mind — such
as limited memory span — and in the environment — such as informa-
tion costs — optimization under constraints replaced unbounded rationality.
Once humans are assumed to have not a perfect knowledge of past, present
and future events, inferences about their world inevitably ground in uncer-
tainty forcing them, using Jerome Bruner’s famous phrase, to "go beyond
the information given". At the same time, search must be limited because
real decision makers have only a finite amount of time, knowledge, atten-
tion, or money to spend on a particular decision. Limited search requires
a way to decide when to stop looking for information, that is, a stopping
rule that optimizes search with respect to the time, computation, money,
and other resources being spent. In other words, this vision of rationality
holds that the mind does calculate the benefits and costs of searching for
each further piece of information and stop search as soon as the costs out-
weigh the benefits. Including opportunity costs and second-order costs for
making all these cost-benefit analysis in the whole set of costs (money, time,
disutility), optimization under constraints can require even more knowledge
and computation than unbounded rationality.
Bounded Rationality: Satisficing
In the natural complex real-world environments optimal strategies are
unknown or unknowable. For instance, chess has an optimal solutions, but
no computer or mind can find this optimal sequence in a reasonable amount
of time. Simon argued that the presumed goal of maximization (or op-
timization) is virtually always unrealizable in real life, owing both to the
complexity of the human environment and the limitations of human infor-
mation processing. In his 1956 article on Rational Choice and the Structure
of the Environment Simon suggested that in choice situations "organisms
adapt well enough to satisfice; they do not, in general, optimize"(p. 129).
Maximization means optimization, the process of finding the best solution
for a problem, whereas satisficing (a Northumbrian word for "satisfying")
is a way of making a decision about a set of alternatives in which people,
having a a threshold of acceptability, need only to be able to place goods
on some scale in terms of the degree of satisfaction they will afford. Since
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the scale of acceptability enables one to reject a formerly chosen good for a
higher ranked one should that one turn up, a satisficer often moves in the
direction of maximization without ever having it as a deliberate goal. Such
strategies can be beneficial if they save enough cognitive effort to justify any
loss with respect to the highest expected payoff. (H. A. Simon, 1955)
In particular, to select a fulfilled alternative from a series of options en-
countered sequentially, a person (1) sets an aspiration level, (2) chooses the
first one that exceeds the aspiration, and then (3) terminates search. The
aspiration level can be fixed or adjusted following experience (Selten, 2001).
Bounded Rationality: Fast and Frugal Heuristics
The father of bounded rationality stated that because of mind’s limita-
tions, humans "must use approximate methods to handle most tasks"(H. A. Si-
mon, 1990, p.6). However, setting an appropriate aspiration level and the
repeating the comparison of an option to the aspiration level until a satisfac-
tory course of action is found can require a large amount of deliberation on
the part of the decision maker. Most problems of interest are computation-
ally intractable, and this is why humans often rely on heuristics. The term
heuristics is of Greek origin and means "serving to find out or discover". A
heuristics is a strategy that ignores part of the information to make decision
faster, more frugally, and/or more accurately than more complex methods.
The goal of making judgements more quickly and frugally is consistent with
the goal of effort reduction, where frugally is often measured by the num-
ber of cues that a heuristic searches. Fast and frugal heuristics employ a
minimum of time, knowledge, and computation to make adaptive choices in
real environments. For example, decision between two alternatives would
use a form of one-reason decision making, in which only a single piece of





People face varied decisions every day. The French philosopher Albert
Camus once wrote: "Life is a sum of all your choices.". Most real-life de-
cision situations involve some uncertainty. In 1921, the economist Frank
Knight distinguished the concept of uncertainty from risk. In both cate-
gories we have multiple possible outcomes, but in the former case we are not
able to quantify the likelihood of outcomes (Knight, 1921). Since uncertainty
is commonly perceived as unpleasant, the introduction of some basic rules or
approach as to how we may handle that uncertainty results advantageous.
3.1 Adaptive Decision Behavior
The articulation of full-fledged alternatives to the classical rational tradi-
tion ran parallel to the need of a multi-perspective view to better understand
the complex dimensions of the decision making processes. Based upon the
notion of bounded rationality, the study of ecological rationality acknowl-
edges the limitations of the actual human mind as well as the important role
of the environment to which a decision maker must adapt. Simon’s vision of
rationality was an ecological one as illustrated in his famous analogy:
"Human rational behavior [...] is shaped by a scissors whose
blades are the structure of task environments and the computa-
tional capabilities of the actor "(H. A. Simon, 1990, p.7).
Starting from the assumption that the mind is adapted to its environment,
Anderson (1991) developed the theoretical methodology namely rational
analysis. It uses the previous assumption to investigate the structure and
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purpose of representations and cognitive processes by studying the structure
of the environment. The development of the rational analysis comprises the
following six steps:
1. Goals: Specify precisely the goals of the cognitive system.
2. Environment: Develop a formal model of the environment to which
the system is adapted.
3. Computational Limitations: Make the minimal assumptions about
computational limitations.
4. Optimization: Derive the optimal behavioral function given 1-3 above.
5. Data: Examine the empirical literature to see whether the predictions
of the behavioral function are confirmed.
6. Iteration: Repeat, iteratively refining the theory
An experimental evidence is given by Payne et al. (1993) who found that deci-
sion makers are adaptive: they exhibit intelligent, if not optimal, responses to
changes in different tasks and contexts. In particular, individuals use differ-
ent kinds of strategies3 in making decisions, contingent upon different factors
such as the number of alternative available, the degree of time pressure, the
dispersion in the weights for attributes, and differing goals for accuracy and
effort. Often these strategies are heuristic processes. In particular, Payne et
al. (1993) proposed the following more common strategies in making deci-
sions: (a) the weighted additive (WADD) rule; (b) the equal weight (EQW)
heuristic; (c) the satisficing (SAT) heuristic; (d) the lexicographic (LEX)
heuristic; (e) the elimination-by-aspects (EBA) heuristic; (f) the majority
of confirming dimensions (MCD) heuristic; (g) the frequency of good and
bad features (FRQ) heuristic; (h) the lexicographic (LEX) heuristic; (i) the
combined strategies; and (j) other heuristics. Nevertheless, individuals are
continuously involved in changing their strategies opportunistically on the
fly as they learn about the task environment, failures in adaptivity do occur.
3In the framework of adaptive decision behavior, a strategy is defined as a method
(sequence of operations) for searching through the decision problem space, i.e. the decision
maker’s internal representation of the task environment (Payne et al., 1993, p.23).
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3.2 Adaptive Toolbox
Like many other commonly used words, "rationality"has come to mean
many things. In many of its uses, rational is approximately equivalent to
"intelligent"or "successful"to describe actions that have desirable outcomes
(Cyert & March, 1963, p.1). Citing a notable scholar in the science of
decision-making
"The best kind of thinking, which we shall call rational think-
ing, is whatever kind of thinking best helps people achieve their
goals"(Baron, 2000, p.61) .
Extending the definition given by Gigerenzer & Selten (2001) in the chapter
dedicated to The Adaptive Toolbox to the whole set of rules a decision maker
may use, the success (or the failure) of a strategy — not only focusing on
heuristics — lies in its degree of adaption to the structure of the physical and
social environments. In this logic, the adaptive toolbox provides strategies
to achieve goals and includes learning mechanisms that allow an adjustment
of tools when environments change to make decisions quickly, frugally, and
accurately. In other words the adaptive toolbox refers to the whole collection
of methods that decision makers use.
3.2.1 Cognitive Building Blocks
In the strategy selection a decision maker, when faced with a judgment
or choice task, evaluates the available tools in his or her toolbox in terms of
relative benefits and costs and selects the one that is best fitted for solving the
decision problem (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). In particular, we can identify
three classes of processes that models of bounded rationality typically specify.
1. Search Rules
The process of search is modeled on step-by-step procedures, where a
piece of information is acquired, or an adjustment is made (e.g., gaze
heuristic: adapt running speed to keep the angle of gaze constant),
and then the process is repeated until it is stopped. Both search for
alternatives (the choice set: satisficing) and for cues (to evaluate the
alternatives: fast and frugal heuristics) include random search, ordered
search (e.g., looking up cues according to their validities: Take The
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Best heuristic) and search for imitation. On the other hand, non-
cognitive rules like emotions can reduce choice sets more effectively
and longer-lasting than cognitive search tools. For example, disgust
can eliminate large numbers of alternatives from the search space.
2. Stopping Rules
Despite of we are driven by the Aristotelian spirit "All men desire
knowledge (to know) by nature", there is a problem with the idea that
more search is always better. The search for possibilities, evidence, and
goals takes time and effort — the so called accuracy-effort trade-off. A
fundamental consequence of Bayesian decision making, and unbounded
rationality, is that knowing more can never be disadvantageous. Gold-
stein & Gigerenzer (1999) investigated whether an extra knowledge
and the time taken in access to process that information improve an-
swers. Their strong conclusion is the less-is-more-effect : there are
situations where less effort — as function of the amount of information
and computation consumed — leads to more accuracy even when infor-
mation and computation are entirely free. Knowing more is not usually
thought to decrease decision-making performance, but sometimes more
information and computation can decrease accuracy; therefore minds
rely on simple heuristics4. A suggestive analysis is offered by Geanako-
plos (1990) on decision making and game theory environments where
information processing is subject to error. He proved that in decisions
— where the information sets are without partitions — the more is
better property doesn’t hold showing that an agent may be (ex-ante)
worse off knowing more because he may not process information coher-
ently. So, strategies in the adaptive toolbox need to employ stopping
rules that stop search for alternatives and cues at some point. Thus, we
must balance the benefit of thorough search against the cost of search
itself. Ordinarily, search is most useful at the beginning of thinking,
and there is a "point of diminishing returns"beyond which search is no
longer useful.
4For example, heuristics such as tallying and take-the-best predict more accurately
than multiple regression, despite using less information and computation (Gigerenzer &
Brighton, 2009). Furthermore, because accuracy and effort of different heuristics will
vary across task environment, a decision maker will have to use strategies in a contingent
fashion in order to be adaptive (Payne et al., 1988, 1993).
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3. Decision Rules
After search is stopped and a limited amount of information has been
acquired, a simple decision rule is applied: a decision or inference must
be made. For example, we may choose an object on the base of the
most important reason — rather than trying to compute the optimal
weights for all reasons, and integrating these reasons in a linear or
nonlinear fashion, as is done in computing a Bayesian solution.
3.2.2 How do toolbox’s rules work? Maximizing vs. Satis-
ficing
Here, we want to make more clear how strategies in the Adaptive Tool-
box actually help to handle our goals. We can summarize the way to make
a good decision according to the rational choice in the following way: you
should (1) look before you leap; (2) analyze before you act; (3) list all the
alternatives and consequences; (4) estimate the probabilities; and (5) do the
calculations. Gigerenzer et al. (1999) presented a joke to highlight how this
approach does not describe the way real people think. A professor was strug-
gling to decide whether to stay at Columbia University or to accept a job
offer from a rival university. A colleague advised him: "Just maximize your
expected utility — you always write about doing this". Exasperated, the
professor responded:"Come on, this is serious". A proliferation of options
can pose significant problems for a maximizer. Savage (1972) used a prudent
approach: any reasonable representation of behaviors in terms of maximizing
had to be limited to small worlds. This restriction implies that the possible
states-of-the-world upon which agents were taking decisions had to finite,
well-known to everyone, and everyone could somehow come up with prob-
ability distributions over them. In their work Gigerenzer & Selten (2001)
noted that optimization is feasible only in a restricted set of problems —
optimization is always relative to a number of assumptions about the en-
vironment, social and physical, that are typically uncertain. In addiction,
seven specific for not optimizing are indicated: (a) if multiple competing
goals exist, optimization can become a heavy and unbearable computational
burden, (b) if incommensurable goals exist, optimization can be impossible,
(c) if incommensurable reasons (or cues) exist, optimization can be impossi-
ble, (d) if the alternatives are unknown and need to be generated in a lengthy
process of search, optimization models assuming a finite, known choice set
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do not apply, (e) if the cues or reasons are unknown and need to be gener-
ated in a lengthy process of search, optimization models that assume a finite,
known set of predictors do not apply, (f) if future consequences of actions
and events are unknown, optimization models assuming a known, finite set
of consequences do not apply, and (g) if optimization is attempted for the
multitude of decisions an organism faces in real time, this can lead to paral-
ysis5 by computational explosion. (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001, p 40-41)
According to Schwartz et al. (2002), the maximizer aspires to the "best",
but one cannot be sure to make the best choice without examining all the
alternatives. And, if examination of all the alternatives is not feasible, then
when the maximizer finally chooses, there may be a persistent doubt that
he or she could have done better with more searching. Thus, as options in-
crease, the likelihood of successful maximization goes down. Moreover, the
attempt to successfully implement a maximizing strategy causes in people
committed in doing that less life satisfaction, optimism and self-esteem and
more regret and depression, which suggests that they may bias their own self
evaluations downwards (Schwartz et al., 2002)
Another relevant study, focused on individual differences in adult decision-
making competence, suggests that people reporting a stronger desire to max-
imize obtain worse life outcomes (de Bruin et al., 2007).
Consequently, it becomes more and more plausible the idea that strategies
in the adaptive toolbox bet on the environment being totally confident on
past experiences or inquiring without a complete analysis and a subsequent
optimization. For example, like in many other real domains (Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2011), people appear to rely strongly on heuristics when mak-
ing food choices. Given the myriads of food decisions individuals face every
day, they quickly accumulate expertise in this domain that make them aware
about the attributes the value most (Schulte-Mecklenbeck et al., 2013).
5The so called paralysis by analysis is due to over-analyzing (or over-thinking) a sit-
uation so that a decision or action is never taken, in effect paralyzing the outcome. The
analysis paralysis can occur with many decisions, including investment decisions such as
buying or selling securities. The inaction it causes can easily lead to losses in a portfolio
or missed chances at larger profits.
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3.3 What do people do?
The central question is how do people make decisions when time is lim-
ited, information unreliable, and the future uncertain? Based on the work
of Nobel laureate Herbert Simon and with the help of colleagues around
the world, the Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) Group at the Max
Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin has developed a research
program on simple heuristics, also known as fast and frugal heuristics. In
the social sciences, heuristics have been believed to be generally inferior to
complex methods for inference, or even irrational. Although this may be
true in "small worlds" where everything is known for certain(Savage, 1972),
Gigerenzer et al. (1999) show that in the actual world in which we live, full of
uncertainties and surprises, heuristics are indispensable and often more accu-
rate than complex methods. Contrary to a common belief, complex problems
do not necessitate complex computations: Less can be more. Simple heuris-
tics exploit the information structure of the environment, and thus embody
ecological rather than logical rationality. In psychology, a dual-process of
reasoning posits that humans operate on the grounds of two distinct sys-
tems of cognition. Kahneman (2003, 2011) call them System 1 (driven by
intuition — fast, parallel, automatic, effortless, associative, slow-learning,
emotional) and System 2 (driven by reasoning — slow, serial, controlled,
effortful, rule-governed, flexible, neutral). Using Kahneman’s terms, we are
going to focus our attention on whether the financial markets’s agents use
System 1 or System 2 to take their decisions. "Actual" or "real-world"market
prices are complex entities, and the knowledge of whether patterns of prices
have moved toward greater conformity with a theory is the outcome of a
difficult, and often a contested, process (MacKenzie, 2006). An exemplar
general methodology for pricing a derivative is the Black-Scholes-Merton
model6. Nevertheless the Black-Scholes-Merton model had the effect of re-
ducing discrepancies between empirical prices and the model (MacKenzie
& Millo, 2003), today it would be unusual to find the Black-Scholes-Merton
model being used directly as a guide to trading options: in options exchanges,
banks’ trading rooms, and hedge funds, the model has been adapted and al-
6The Black-Scholes-Merton model is mentioned by our interviewed bankers as a relevant
instrument for their decisions. And, its role is discussed in Section 5.1 as a scientific
approach and in Section 6.2.
24
tered in many ways (MacKenzie, 2006). The model’s "replicating portfolio"7
methodology, however, remains fundamental. The arbitrager David Wein-
berger, a mathematics Ph.D. who has been involved in financial markets since
the mid 1970s, says: "You can’t be an analytical person who’s involved in the
marketplace day after day without believing that there are little pockets of
structure."(Weinberger interview). MacKenzie & Millo (2003) argued that
sophisticated models might not seem necessary even for options for which
the probability of exercise was higher, and financial markets’ participants
could, for example, turn to rule-of-thumb pricing heuristics like those used
in the ad hoc options market8.
7We define a "replicating portfolio"as a continuously adjusted position in the stock
plus borrowing or lending of cash that exactly mirrors the returns from the option.
8From Sheen T. Kassouf interview: Kassouf recalls that for options with strike price




Empirical Evidence from an
Investment and a Central
Bank: Adaptive Toolbox?
There is ample evidence supporting H. A. Simon (1955)’s observation
that decision making often does not — and perhaps cannot — fully sat-
isfy the axioms of rationality (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). Moreover many
real-world problems in economics and finance are characterized by "Knight-
ian"uncertainty (Aikman et al., 2014). Thus, considering that the rationality
of decision makers is bounded and that consistent and rational rules become
untenable in a world of uncertainty, the identification and characterization
of the whole set of tools and rules to deal with uncertainty becomes more
relevant in decision making. The economist Heiner (1983) has argued that
economic behavior is predictable largely because bounded rationality leads
people to adopt rules of thumb which display greater regularity than does
optimization. In particular, economic behavior may be predictable exactly
because of limited human capacity to maximize when faced with uncertainty.
This uncertainty results from human failure to properly distinguish environ-
mental situations and to choose the right actions even if the situations are
correctly identified. Regularities of human behavior can be understood as
behavioral rules to restrict the flexibility to choose potential actions. These
mechanisms simplify behavior to less-complex patterns, which are easier for
an observer to predict. In the special case of no uncertainty, the behav-
ior of perfectly informed, fully optimizing agents responding with complete
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flexibility to every perturbation in their environment would not produce eas-
ily recognizable patterns, but rather extremely unpredictable behavior. So,
paradoxically Heiner (1983) has contended that the greater the uncertainty,
the more limited the repertoire and the more predictable the behavior.Yet,
there is much left to learn about the "tools"in the "adaptive toolbox"that
are used to make a decision. In this chapter we provide a brief (and neces-
sarily incomplete) assessment of observed structures used by bankers, which
are discussed more in details in the next chapter.
4.1 Overview: Research Context
By this study we want to better understand and improve financial behav-
ior under uncertainty. In their analysis on traders in hedge funds and invest-
ment banks9, Hardie & MacKenzie (2007) argue that traders face what is
effectively unlimited information that could influence their decision making,
and a crucial element of their decision making is what information to focus
on10. Thus, they conclude that the selection of information has an influence
on the trading decisions and, as a result, on the prices of the assets, and
selection is heavily influenced by the interaction between traders and other
market traders. Our research is based on predate conceptions and ideas.
Gigerenzer & Selten (2001) have criticized economic theories that rely exclu-
sively on logic and probability introducing the adaptive toolbox, Lo (2004)
called for a new kind of rationality in finance in The adaptive markets hypoth-
esis; and March (1994) has made similar points in general business contexts
of managing human behavior. In particular, previous researchers conducted
empirical studies on the toolbox of financial practitioners. For example,
previous studies investigated corporate leaders (Maidique, 2011), technology
strategists (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011), central bankers (M. Y. Abolafia,
2010). More specifically, as far as we know this current study seems to
provide the first empirical evidence on the toolbox of bankers for coping
with uncertainty. The research is still in progress, but so far we identified a
multitude of coping ways beyond probabilistic reasoning and discussed their
9Hardie & MacKenzie (2007) conducted interviews with snowball sample (numbering
41) to gain better knowledge about their trading strategies, the information they make
use of in those strategies, the constraints upon them and so on.
10This issue is already raised in H. A. Simon (1955); M. Abolafia (2001); Beunza &
Stark (2004).
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functionality and adaptive use.
4.2 Research Hypotheses
Models representing uncertainty as probability distribution — treating
uncertainty as risk — are commonly used to analyze reasoning and decision-
making in banking. But, as Knight (1921) pointed out, much of economic
interactions are characterized by deep uncertainty that is difficult or impos-
sible to quantify. Aikman et al. (2014) have recently argued that financial
systems are better characterized by uncertainty than by risk because they
are subject to so many unpredictable factors. In this particular study, four
different situations are identified in which bankers face problems where un-
certainty cannot be fully handled by probability: (i) economic theories are
contradicted by reality and it is not clear how to revise them, (ii) there needs
to be consensus on making forecasts and policy decisions but team members
disagree, (iii) information about other players has to be extracted from prices,
and (iv) the relevance of other players and their possible reactions are not
known. These four problems are not randomly chosen, but they refer to two
important kinds of uncertainty. The first type, model uncertainty, occurs be-
cause the economic world is complex and no market participant knows the
"true"probabilistic model of an economic development. The second class,
strategic uncertainty, comes from the fact that a market participant does
not always know who the other key players are or what their actions may
be. But a market participant needs this knowledge because, for instance, the
actions of key players in the market influence price movements in the short
and medium run. Problems (i-ii) are problems of model uncertainty, whereas
problems (iii-iv) are problems of strategic uncertainty11. All these consid-
erations lead us, without denying the importance of probability, to suppose
that the toolbox of laypeople and finance professionals includes other tools
as well. In this case, it is essential to know the contents of the toolbox and
the way they combine for coping with uncertainty. Summarizing, to investi-
gate bankers’ cognition under uncertainty the following two hypotheses are
developed:
11For a critique to this structure see Section 6.3.
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Hypothesis 1 : The toolbox of bankers for coping with problems of cogni-
tion under uncertainty includes other coping ways beyond probabilistic
reasoning.
Hypothesis 2 : The coping ways in the bankers’ toolbox for problems of
cognition under uncertainty serve complementary functions and are
used adaptively.
4.3 Method
In order to investigate bankers’ cognition under uncertainty in-person,
in-depth12 interviews were led by Timo Ehrig and Konstantinos V. Kat-
sikopoulos13 between November 2012 and May 2013. Interviews were con-
ducted conducted in two banks. One bank is an investment bank and is
part of a leading global financial-services company. The other one is a cen-
tral bank and is the model on which many modern central banks have been
based. These banks are selected since considered the key players in today’s
financial system representing entrepreneurialism and regulation. This be-
lief was shared with the interviewed. The data sources used in the research
includes:
1. qualitative and quantitative data from the interviews
2. observations during the on-site visits
3. emails and phone calls for preparing the interviews and filling gaps in
accounts after the interviews
4. archival data such as press releases and reports published by the banks.
12In-depth interviews are most appropriate for situations in which you want to ask
open-ended questions that elicit depth of information from relatively few people (as op-
posed to surveys or structured interviews, which tend to be more quantitative and are
conducted with larger sample). Indeed, we want to emphasize the validity, i.e. how close
answers get to the respondents’ real views, which distinguishes in-depth interviews from
structured ones. Consequently more valid information about respondents’ attitudes, val-
ues and opinions can be obtained, particularly how people explain and contextualize these
issues.
13Respectively, post doctoral research associate in the group of Jüergen Jost at Max
Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Leipzig; and senior researcher in the
ABC group at Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin.
29
The primary data source consists in semi-structured interviews lasting 30-60
minutes. 25 individuals, of which 14 in the investment bank and 8 in the cen-
tral bank (and 3 other workers in the financial sector in a pilot study), were
interviewed. Information on the interviewees in the two banks is provided in
Table 1. Briefly, interviewed people varied in:
Table 1: Information on the two banks and interviewees
Investment
Bank
Leading global financial company. Services: investment bank-
ing, private banking and asset management. Total assets: more
than 1 trillion USD.
14 interviewees. Expertise: sales and trading (11), research and




Model on which many modern central banks have been based.
Purposes: financial stability and monetary policy. Reserves:
more than 600 billion USD (without quantitative easing).
8 interviewees. Expertise: research and forecasting (8); specifi-
cally, financial stability (4) and monetary policy (4). Job: man-
agement (2), communication (2) and technical (4).
• length of experience (from one to twenty-five years)
• domain of expertise (from algorithmic trading to lobbying with policy
makers)
• job responsibility (from technical analysis to participation in a mone-
tary policy committee)
No recording devices or other electronic/computing equipment were used
to maintain an informal atmosphere that can encourage the respondent to
be open and honest. Two fieldworkers: the first person charged with the
direction of the interview went over a list of questions on cognition under
uncertainty, adapting the questions and adjusting direction as the interview
is taking place; while the second person took notes. Roles were interchange-
able, and at some points during some interviews the two interviewers changed
places with each other. Questions partly referred to the (i-iv) key problems
of cognition under uncertainty — listed in Section 4.2 — that bankers face.
A sample of the questions on these problems is provided in Table 2.
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In addition, interviewees were also asked to talk about their expertise and
job and about how they cope with uncertainty, so that eventually the in-
terview centered on these issues. Questions were asked in a non-suggestive
manner. In a second moment the two interviewers and me — in the role of
a third independent coder14 — have worked, first independently and then
jointly on analyzing and coding the notes, and this process was repeated a
number of times until — not intentionally — convergence was achieved.
Table 2: A sample of the questions used in the interviews, referring to two
key problems of model uncertainty (MU) and two key problems of strategic
uncertainty (SU). In each interview, the questions were adapted according to




Which parts of a theory do you keep under all
conditions and which parts are you willing to give
up and when?
How do you recognize a structural change in a pro-






How are contradictory explanations or forecasts
of an economic phenomenon dealt with?




about other player from
prices (SU)
What information about other players do you ex-
tract from prices?




players in the market
and their actions (SU)
How do you determine the players in a market?
How do you determine the relative sophistication,
in terms of reasoning, of other players?
4.4 Empirical Results
In a rather skeptical manner, we scrutinized: "What evidence do we have
on the tools characterizing expert bankers’ adaptive toolbox?"
It is important to highlight that the labels used to describe the coping ways
are our own and were not used verbatim by the participants. In particular,
we clustered similar utterances and associated labels capturing the essential
14In total two experts independent coders who could extract meaning and one blind
independent coder took part to this study.
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idea of these groups of similar utterances.
The ways for coping with model uncertainty emerged from the interviews —
illustrated by participant quotes in Table 3 — are summarized by the follow-
ing 11 labels: (1) Use a scientific approach, develop hypotheses and models
and test them with data; (2) Institutionalize group discussions; (3)Construct
narratives and evaluate them; (4) Use heuristics to work with data and
models; (5) Make judgments; (6) Draw analogies; (7) Use causal inference
and mental simulation; (8) Use intuition and introspection; (9) Manage risk
rather than try to predict; (10) Set your investment horizon; (11) Acknowl-
edge the value of disagreement.
Table 3: Epigrammatic descriptions of ways of coping with model uncer-
tainty, illustrated by participant quotes. Note that the labels used to describe
the coping ways are our own and were not used verbatim by the participants.
1. Use a scientific approach, develop hypotheses and models and test them with data
"I build hypotheses, which I try to test, for example, let’s say that it is 50-50 whether
the market goes up or down, I try to reason about the relevant conditional proba-
bilities and associated variances and their gradients, a hypothesis could be that an
observed sample is an outlier, another hypothesis could be that the market is bull.";
"I test models under worst-case scenarios"; "Monetary economics is halfway between
sociology and physics".
2. Institutionalize group discussions
"The committee offers feedback, sometimes there is a mistake, sometimes they offer
technical advice (not during committee meetings, however). The relationship of the
research staff with the monetary policy committee can be like student/supervisor or
patient/doctor — both roles are possible"; "The role of the staff is to give the com-
mittee hypotheses to consider and to help the committee to understand information";
"We come up with worse case scenarios by sitting down and thinking of something
bad, consistent with past problems such as Japan in the 1970s but believable, and
reach consensus about what will happen"; "We had a vigorous debate".
3. Construct narratives and evaluate them
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"Committee members prefer narratives, even at the cost of worse predictions"; "Sta-
tistical models are not believed as long as there is no story"; "Build a narrative for
each forecast"; "You cross-check narrative with broad enough class of economic mod-
els"; "Staff builds up narrative and committee resolves contradiction, if there are
contradictions, you challenge the underlying narrative"; "Example of a story that has
been replaced by another one (the first story was accepted by the committee in Jan
2012 and replaced in May 2012): the first story predicts that by the end of 2012,
inflation is back to under 2%, the second story was that inflation will be closer to
3%, note that the statistical models predicted the latter. The first story was that the
significant slack in labor market should put pay pressure down and this should lead
to low inflation. The staff wanted to persuade the committee about the prediction of
the statistical models and generated a story: if you believe that inflation will be down
to 1.8% then you have to believe that other components in the consumer basket will
go down by unusual amounts "; "All committee members agreed that wage increases
should be higher but disagreed on the reasons (or disagreed on whether loss of pro-
ductivity is permanent or not), it is hard to know which explanation is better. You
have to know how they arose. Logical consistency is definitely a must for acceptance
of an explanation"; "A good narrative has to have flawless logic, political appeal and
market the bank’s response"; "Explaining is more important than predicting"; "I
construct narratives to deal with unknowables".
4. Use heuristics to work with data and models
"There is no scientific evidence yet about how well their own models of the trans-
mission mechanism work, they were developed by using rules of thumb (example:
setting the money multiplier, gave arguments of why it would be more than 1 (if
the quantitative-easing actions lead banks to lend more) and why it would be less
(if we bought bonds of the banking sector))"; "In a first round we settled on 0.7, in
a second round some people believed in different money multiplier"; "You need to
apply heuristics".
5. Make judgments
"A simple rule like no leverage ratio larger than 10% would not work because risks
would be off-loaded to unregulated institutions such as hedge funds"; "The monetary
policy committee entertains high-level discussions; it makes some key judgments and
the staff works on them, for example, it is likely that euro-zone risks persist, there
is a low financial stability risk, no big moves in commodity prices, and a judgment
about the outlook for prices in general"; "My team uses market intelligence and makes
judgments".
6. Draw analogies
"Sit down and think of something bad, consistent with past problems but something
that people could believe, and reach consensus, for example, by going back to severe
recessions such as in Japan or in the 70’s when there was a sharp fall of individual
output, which led to contractions, V-shaped or U-shaped"; "During the early part of
financial crisis, they may form expectations from other recessions, by using analogy
as in, for instance, what happened to labor market in 90s, by recession hysteresis".
7. Use causal inference and mental simulation
33
"The most important thing about a model is knowing when it won’t work. For
example, if the bid-ask spread equal to 15 basis points means that you cannot use a
standard pricing model"; "I use hypotheticals, if this happens, then this will happen
as well, and then..."; "My team engages on a lot of counterfactual thinking (e.g.,
estimate effect of quantitative easing by running models without it)"; "You cannot
have a long career in finance without thinking logically".
8. Use intuition and introspection
"Every morning I ask myself why I am on this"; "Try to find out what you are not
thinking about"; "I know what the right price is, that’s why they pay me the big
bucks"; "Some people are good at recognizing patterns".
9. Manage risk rather than try to predict
"I make no forecasts, only look at prices and just evaluate risk relative to opportunity,
that’s all (e.g., a call option gives you the upside and you have to see how to fund
it; options-pricing)"; "I am more interested in managing risk rather than predicting
well, the point of risk management is: after you crossed a threshold, give your view
up, for example, if you are right, you expect 5% gain and if you are wrong, you expect
-1.5% loss, so if you get to - 1.5%, give up".
10. Set your investment horizon
"In the long run, the model works, but, in the short run, I also use other information
(who’s buying, who’s selling, etc.)"; "In short run the quick money (e.g., hedge funds
and trading desks) dominates; in a 3-month perspective it matters what big players
(e.g., Pimco or Black Rock) are doing"; "Fundamentals prevail, maybe not over 1-2
weeks but over 6-8 months".
11. Acknowledge the value of disagreement
"If everybody around the table says the same, you should worry"; "If you have too
much agreement, then it could very easily go the other way"; "75% of the time, 10
out 12 dealers would agree, but they are proved wrong"; "There are groupthink prob-
lems"; "In my teams, I try to mix a quant. model-driven guy with an experienced, less
quant. guy"; "Once everybody moved to one side (made a bet in one direction) they
are much more exposed to shocks in one direction, this is sentiments in positioning
(the balance of bets is skewed)".
The ways for coping with strategic uncertainty emerged from the interviews
— illustrated by participant quotes in Tables 4 — are summarized by the
following 7 labels: (1) Make others predictable; (2) Develop theory of mind of
others; (3) Determine the relevant players; (4) Reason hypothetically about
others; (5) Choose your level of reasoning or change the rules of the game;
(6) Determine trend breaks from prices; (7) Communicate to others and try
to influence them.
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Table 4: Epigrammatic descriptions of ways of coping with strategic uncer-
tainty, illustrated by participant quotes. Note that the labels used to describe
the coping ways are our own and were not used verbatim by the participants.
1. Make others predictable
"I put in a lot of small orders and then cancel them [to find out about reactions of
other players], you can do this in Canada because there you can know all others’
orders"; "To see whether or not a decision of a client is trend-breaking, that is, if
the client changes his overall strategy, you have to know the client well, if one client
is breaking his trend, then it is likely that other clients will also break their trend";
"Australian banks are more unpredictable than European banks, they have just four
big banks but you do not know which way they are going to push, their forwards
are difficult to anticipate while European banks always try to borrow dollars"; "It all
comes down to knowing your clients and how predictable they are".
2. Develop theory of mind of others
"I ask myself what the other players will finally price"; "I try to find out the others’
breadth of thinking"; "I try to find vulnerable points in other people’s thinking"; "If
you can’t find the sucker in the poker table, it’s you"; "We are suspicious that hedge
funds are not telling us everything"; "Big banks assume that they will be bailed out".
3. Determine the relevant players
"I think about key players in the market; there are 30-40 big accounts that can make
a difference"; "You want to think about each of the big players separately (there is
just a few of them), such as Black Water and Howard (big hedge funds)"; "To find
out who the key players are, I read and interview"; "You can never be sure if you
have identified all key players but it helps you if you are embedded in the system
(e.g., Wall Street)".
4. Reason hypothetically about others
"I play what-if scenarios to myself, it’s like a tree, you have to put in probabilities
(back of the envelope calculations)"; "I analyze other players, by thinking how they
will react under many different circumstances"; "I know that the customer (e.g.,
IBM pension fund) will call around other banks, and I engage in an iterative game";
"I reason through the logic of the others"; "I try to find vulnerable points in the
reasoning of others by client calls/meetings".
5. Choose your level of reasoning or change the rules of the game
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"Players want to be epsilon-better than others (so that they can get a bonus), they
do not follow the whole infinite regress"; "Both the banks and the central bank
try to develop a theory of mind of others, but they do not go many levels deep";
"Banks choose risk weights so as to make balance sheets look like they meet capital
requirements"; "Banks try to guess your concern, and make it look like they are
cutting lending"; "The prudent calculation of risk weights could be fine but also
not, a big issue is that big banks assume that they would be bailed out. No perfect
response to that, in Basel banks have to redo their balance sheets based on others’
risk weights, also a simple rule like no leverage ratio larger than 10% would not solve
it because risks would be off-loaded to unregulated institutions such as hedge funds";
"In the end, the pragmatic response would have to be in the middle from simple to
complex (simple would not be that fair to some banks)".
6. Determine trend breaks from prices
"I see a few things from LIBOR [London Interbank Offered Rate] rates, and their
changes (I do that because the forwards market is affected a lot by the changes in
the inter-bank rates), I drill down to make it more granular"; "I use the call volume
weighted by the delta of the underlying option as an indicator of sentiments"; "I try
to observe a regime switching by listening to what clients say and a change in the talk,
knowing what traders observe (e.g., traders said that everything was correlated with
the euro), also when things start breaking down"; "When there is a credit spread,
this means that there is a buyer and a seller and they disagree, this is interesting
because they are probably not that stupid, so what’s happening?"; "The hedge funds
speak to each other, in 2005-2006, there were hedge fund conferences in which people
said that things were not sustainable, at a conference then, the top trade idea was to
look at which things were not sustainable, people who believed that things were not
sustainable were just investors who didn’t act on it, investors didn’t want to believe
but the research was there, it was easier to believe that the trend will continue".
7. Communicate to others and try to influence them
"Target interest rate signals the bank’s commitment"; "The bank realizes that how
they explain a policy will have an impact, especially for surprising decisions, so, the
bank gives a lot of information (reports, minutes of meetings, interviews on radio
and TV) which, overall, is used well"; "The staff communicate a bit to the public,
the committee more, the public responds a lot to the minutes, especially to the
quantitative parts"; "The bank thinks about people’s expectations but does not try
to manipulate them, it would be a dangerous game to play"; "We try to help people
understand their decision processes by giving them a lot of information"; "We all go
to equity research conferences and there is a lot of interaction there"; "You may, or
not, communicate to your clients your belief about the yen/dollar exchange rate"; "I





This chapter is devoted to the presentation of all the major results that
we obtained. Even though findings are qualitative, they have precise enough
form so that they can be used in quantitative theories developed in disci-
plines such as economics, finance and psychology. To gain understanding of
how people cope — or should cope — with uncertainty requires a multidis-
ciplinary approach employing different disciplines such as cognitive science,
personality psychology, sociology and epistemic game theory.
In what follows, we will show that practicing bankers use other coping ways
beyond probabilistic reasoning (see Hypothesis 1). Our results show that
bankers rely on a multitude of coping ways, or as they are also called heuris-
tics or rules of thumb (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Bingham & Eisenhardt,
2011). In Gigerenzer & Selten (2001)’s terms, minds of the bankers resemble
an adaptive toolbox. We also show that the coping ways are used adaptively
(see Hypothesis 2).
Below, we first discuss ways of coping with model uncertainty and then ways
of coping with strategic uncertainty. The discussion of each coping way cen-
ters on trying to understand its function, that is, how it helps to reason or
decide under uncertainty. We also comment on whether a coping way is more
prevalent in one of the two banks and speculate on why this is so.
5.1 Ways of coping with model uncertainty
Now we are going to discuss one by one the 11 ways of copying with
model uncertainty listed in Section 4.4.
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• Over two thirds of investment bankers and almost all central bankers
mentioned the coping way of using a scientific approach, developing
hypotheses and models and testing them with data. Models and fore-
casts are important inputs into any decision-making process whether it
relates to business or to monetary policy (e.g., Pagan (2003); Cayen et
al. (2009) for a range of models that have been or are being used in cen-
tral banks). Given that participants are mostly trained in economics
and finance or in other sciences such as physics and computer science,
one should expect this first result. Even if the market is notoriously
difficult to understand, it may be a reasonable reaction to try to under-
stand it scientifically. In effect, participants affirmed to frequently rely
their work on mathematical models such as Black-Scholes equations,
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models or statistical
regressions15. An interesting issue is how the scientific approach works
in the practice of banking. As not every possible hypothesis can be
tested, bankers clearly make choices about which few hypotheses to
consider. For example, one participant said "A hypothesis could be
that an observed sample is an outlier, another hypothesis could be
that the market is bull"and another one said "I test models under
worst-case scenarios". In sum, our participants seemed to be sensitive
to the fact that selecting hypotheses is central to making reasonable
inductions. More generally, our interviewees seemed to have a realistic
view of the kind of science they could practice in their job. One said:
"Monetary economics is halfway between sociology and physics". This
may mean that approximate and qualitative reasoning is used as in the
following quote: "Let’s say that it is 50-50 whether the market goes
up or down, I try to reason about the relevant conditional probabili-
ties and associated variances and their gradients". In the investment
bank, hypotheses were generated either by individuals or small teams,
but no hypothesis was known by the whole investment bank. Con-
versely, in the central bank many hypotheses appear to be built and
tested by large teams and some hypotheses are known and discussed in
15For an excellent discussion of the importance of expanding knowledge about
macroeconomics and econometrics for the practice of central banking, see the re-




the whole organization. This becomes more clear considering the next
coping way.
• More than half of central bankers and only one investment banker men-
tioned The institutionalization of group discussions. Central bankers
made it clear that group discussions are an integral part of their orga-
nizational culture: "The committee offers feedback, sometimes there
is a mistake, sometimes they offer technical advice (not during com-
mittee meetings, however). The relationship of the research staff with
the monetary policy committee can be like student/supervisor or pa-
tient/doctor — both roles are possible", "The role of the staff is to
give the committee hypotheses to consider and to help the committee
to understand information"and "We come up with worse case scenar-
ios by sitting down and thinking of something bad, consistent with
past problems such as Japan in the 1970s but believable, and reach
consensus about what will happen". This result makes sense because
the central bank has a small number of big goals — such as how to set
the interest rates, how to decide whether financial stability risks are
elevated or not and what policy response is most appropriate — for
which it needs shared cognition (Hutchins, 1995). Differently, invest-
ment bankers focus on generating value for the stakeholders, essentially
in any way that works. This is a first evidence that work in the invest-
ment bank is almost individual whereas it is much more team-based
in the central bank; this property is also identified in the discussion
of other findings. Consistently, M. Y. Abolafia (2010) argues that in
policy groups such as central banks, cognition and knowledge exist at
a supra-individual level and there is a shared sense of which actions
are appropriate.
Another difference between the two banks organizes the discussion of the
remaining ways of coping with model uncertainty. The central bankers said
that they use what we may call primarily a thinking approach, reporting
the following ways: construct narratives and evaluate them, use heuristics
to work with data and models, make judgments, use mental simulation and
causal inference and draw analogies. The investment bankers said that they
use what we may call primarily a practical approach, reporting the following
ways: manage risk rather than try to predict, set your investment horizon,
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use intuition and introspection and acknowledge the value of disagreement.
5.1.1 Ways of copying with model uncertainty used by cen-
tral bankers
We now discuss the coping ways mentioned almost exclusively by central
bankers.
• Constructing narratives and evaluating them appeared to be very im-
portant for the central bank. The role of narratives in financial be-
havior has been discussed by Tuckett (2011), who proposed them as
a mean in understanding the context — that limits our possibilities
— in which we are insert. Examining the narrative construction at
the US Federal Reserve, M. Y. Abolafia (2010) argued that updated
and revised narratives — governed by logics of appropriateness and
emotional components — enable the interpreter to explain the mis-
fit between facts and models. In this way, they clarify discrepancies
and fill in absent complexities. Our results support the idea that pol-
icy makers moved from models to narrative to guide actions (Tuckett,
2011; M. Y. Abolafia, 2010), as shown in the following quotes by our
participants: "Committee members prefer narratives, even at the cost
of worse predictions", "Statistical models are not believed as long as
there is no story"and "Build a narrative for each forecast". We develop
different functions of narratives that highlight their relevant role. (i)
Policy makers, such as the members of the central bank’ s monetary
policy committee, have the duty to explain in an easy terms their de-
cisions to the public, politicians and the government and thus need
to have narratives at their disposal. (ii) Narratives are a device for
managing the complex processes operating in a central bank. In to-
tal, hundreds of technical staff are employed at the bank and different
fractions of it give input to different committees responsible (e.g., mon-
etary policy or financial stability). Narratives — with their organized
thoughts and experiences — facilitate the discussions of the commit-
tee members with each other as well as with the staff and support the
eventual convergence to a working understanding or a decision. (iii)
Narratives have a strong and productive interplay with economic mod-
els. Each model highlights some aspects of the economic world but no
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single model captures its totality. Thus, within the central bank or
even within teams of the central bank, predictions and policy implica-
tions of different models often contradict each other. We found that,
in order to solve these contradictions, central bankers back models
with narratives, that is they assemble the assumptions and predictions
of a particular model into a story. This also works vice versa: stories
about economic developments are backed by models, that is models are
found which are consistent with the assumptions and consequences in a
particular story. As one central banker noted: "You cross-check a nar-
rative with broad enough class of economic models". Abolafia (2010)
uses the term abduction to describe how the precision of an economic
model and the richness of narrative are adapted to each other. (iv)
Instead of particular models or their predictions, narratives compete
in the process of making policy decisions. This process is institution-
alized within the central bank as the following quote illustrates: "The
staff builds up a narrative and the committee resolves a contradiction
[between the narrative of the staff and their own narrative], if there are
contradictions, you challenge the underlying narrative". Moreover, the
following example answer gives us a suggestion on how narratives can
substitute each other in the central bank. "Example of a story that has
been replaced by another one (the first story was accepted by the com-
mittee in Jan. 2012 and replaced in May 2012): the first story predicts
that by the end of 2012, inflation is back to under 2%, the second story
was that inflation will be closer to 3%, note that the statistical mod-
els predicted the latter. The first story was that the significant slack
in labor market should put pay pressure down and this should lead
to low inflation. The staff wanted to persuade the committee about
the prediction of the statistical models and generated a story: if you
believe that inflation will be down to 1.8% then you have to believe
that other components in the consumer basket will go down by unusual
amounts". This example illustrates that narratives are compared by
means of logic. This comparison is possible if narratives are backed
by models since models have logical consistency. In the central bank,
logical consistency is a norm: "Logical consistency is definitely a must
for acceptance of an explanation"and "A good narrative has to have
flawless logic, political appeal and market the bank’ s response".
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• All central bankers mentioned heuristics to work with data and models
as in these quotes: "There is no scientific evidence yet about how well
their own models of the transmission mechanism work, they were devel-
oped by using rules of thumb (example: setting the money multiplier,
gave arguments of why it would be more than 1 (if the quantitative-
easing actions lead banks to lend more) and why it would be less (if
we bought bonds of the banking sector))"and "In a first round we set-
tled on 0.7, in a second round some people believed in different money
multiplier". Dosi & Egidi (1991) indicated the use of routines and
heuristics16 as potential strategies to solve procedural uncertainty —
that is due to human computational limits. More recently, Bingham &
Eisenhardt (2011) developed a theoretical framework suggesting that
companies combine organizational knowledge, organizational routines
and heuristics. They concluded that in unpredictable markets with
heterogeneous opportunities and relatively few experiences, the use of
simple rules heuristics is more "rational"than other analytically com-
plex and information-intensive approaches. Heuristics are defined as
cognitive shortcuts that emerge when information, time, and process-
ing capacity are limited (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). The well-
known "heuristics and biases"research in psychology emphasizes the
limitations of heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); while the con-
trasting psychological research on "fast and frugal heuristics"focuses
on the superiority of heuristics (Gigerenzer et al., 1999)17. The use
of heuristics is supported by (i) the accuracy-effort trade-off and the
related inverse U-shaped relation; and (ii) the ecological rationality
of heuristics that investigates whether a given strategy is preferred to
another since the optimal one is unknown (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier,
2011). Although heuristics can be useful in the financial sphere18, es-
pecially for fast reactions to new challenges, they can also get decision-
16Nevertheless one could observe some nuances, here routines and heuristics belong to
the same class of decisional rules.
17To be fair other differences should be highlighted. For example, conversely to the
work conducted by Gigerenzer and his group, Kahneman’s research is mainly based on
quantitative models and experiments are conducted with students.
18In their recent paper Aikman et al. (2014) argue that simple approaches in modeling
and regulating financial systems may be a complementary tool for dealing with uncertainty.
And, in some circumstances adding complexity may lead to poorer performances. This
conclusion supports the concept of less-is-more (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999; Gigerenzer
& Brighton, 2009).
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makers lost. One needs to exercise judgment about whether to rely
on heuristics or not, as in the following quote: "A simple rule like no
leverage ratio larger than 10% would not work because risks would be
off-loaded to unregulated institutions such as hedge funds".
• Making judgments was mentioned by half of central bankers who indi-
cated judgments as central assumptions to put in models. It appeared
to us that judgments may be more than that, as the following quote
suggests: "The monetary policy committee entertains high-level dis-
cussions, it makes some key judgments and the staff works on them,
for example, it is likely that euro-zone risks persist, there is a low finan-
cial stability risk, no big moves in commodity prices, and a judgment
about the outlook for prices in general". In any case, judgments are
key because they filter unimportant information out and help focus on
what is really important. On the other hand, judgments could also
lead to bad decisions.
• Another coping way mentioned only by central bankers is drawing
analogies. Analogical reasoning is important in both economics and fi-
nance. One of the most serious challenges of learning and problem solv-
ing research is how to act upon novel environments19; and, as (Chan
et al., 2012) pointed out analogical thinking is an ad-hoc tool special-
ized to deal with novelty and uncertainty. People, basically, extract
cues from similar contexts to help them decide on what information
is relevant and what explanations are acceptable. A couple of bankers
mentioned it: "Sit down and think of something bad, consistent with
past problems but something that people could believe, and reach con-
sensus, for example, going back to severe recessions such as in Japan
or in the 70’ s when there was a sharp fall of individual output, which
led to contractions, V-shaped or U-shaped"and "During the early part
of financial crisis, they may form expectations from other recessions,
by using analogy as in, for instance, what happened to labor market in
90s, by recession hysteresis". These quotes clearly show that analogies
can support inductive reasoning. To our surprise, however, analogies
were used almost exclusively by central bankers. This may be because
19Dosi (2012) refers to the persistent innovative opportunities for agents in terms of
discovering new technologies, new ways of organizing, and new behavioral patterns
44
the construction and use of analogies is a complex process that can re-
quire a significant investment of resources which are perhaps scarce in
investment banking. Supporting this idea, an equity analyst noted: "I
avoid using analogies, as they increase the potential for disagreement".
• Using causal inference and mental simulation people hypothesize that
one variable causes another variable. With the belief that almost all
events have a cause, individuals make several kinds of inference (not
just induction), on the basis of various sources of information — infor-
mation about temporal order, interventions, spatiotemporal contiguity,
similarity, analogy and prior knowledge — and of course these causal
relations can be fallible (Lagnado, 2011). Thus, this method represents
the typical reasoning structure of the ways of coping with model un-
certainty we have been discussing: if done right, it allows us to predict
and anticipate the effects of our actions, including those that we have
never taken before. For instance, one senior manager in fixed-income
financial products said: "The most important thing about a model
is knowing when it won’ t work. For example, if the bid-ask spread
exceeds 15 basis points means that you cannot use a standard pricing
model". This utterance is consistent with her going through the follow-
ing causal inferences: If bids and offers differ too much, it means that
prices do not equilibrate; and if prices do not equilibrate, the standard
models which are based on the assumption of market clearing do not
apply. Another of our interviewees explicitly mentioned mental simu-
lation: "I use hypotheticals: if this happens, then this will happen as
well, and then..."
5.1.2 Ways of copying with model uncertainty used by in-
vestment bankers
We now turn to the four ways of coping with model uncertainty which
were only mentioned by investment bankers (approximately from one-third
to one-half of them). In particular, the last three ways of coping with model
uncertainty mentioned only by investment bankers are very ingenuous. These
coping ways accept that model uncertainty makes it almost impossible to do
some things and concentrate on the things that can actually be done.
• First, our interviewees suggested using intuition and introspection. In-
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tuition is the ability to acquire knowledge without inference or the
use of reason, while introspection is a conscious mental and purposive
process relaying on thinking, reasoning, and examination of one’s own
thoughts and perceptions. In particular, introspection appears to be
guided by the willingness to improve as in the following quote: "Every
morning I ask myself why I am on this"and "Try to find out what you
are not thinking about". One could argue that asking such questions
could have been the consequence of humility or self-awareness, but
these traits don’t characterize all the interviewed investment managers:
"I know what the right price is, that’ s why they pay me the big bucks".
Our interviewees showed trust on intuition as when saying: "Some peo-
ple are good at recognizing patterns". In his book Gut Feelings: the
intelligence of the unconscious, Gigerenzer (2007) was wondering firstly
about the origin of intuition, and secondly whether we should trust our
intuition. It is an open research problem to find out the conditions un-
der which intuition should — or not — be trusted. Nevertheless, there
exist cases where intuitive ideas are successful, as for example, when
funds are allocated equally across the assets in a portfolio according to
the naive portfolio diversification rule20 (DeMiguel et al., 2009).
• Using rules based on managing risk rather than trying to predict, in-
vestment manager implicitly accept that they cannot anticipate the
market because of its irreducibly uncertain. Real-world economic sys-
tems are extremely complex and difficult to measure, uncertainty can-
not be eliminated via prediction but must be accepted and dealt with.
In a sense, people should live with the idea that everything can not be
known: "There are known knowns: there are things we know. We also
know that there are also known unknowns, that is we know there are
some things we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns:
the ones we don’t know we don’t know [...]"(Donald Rumsfeld)21. Dosi
(2012) supports this vision: "[...] many economists were so surprised by
the arrival of the big financial crisis. At last (!) they noticed that the
variables of interests generally are not not normally distributed, but
fatter-tailed: there are a lot of big events and black swans are relatively
20Benartzi & Thaler (2001) document that investors allocate their wealth across assets
using the naive 1/N rule.
21https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiPe1OiKQuk
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frequent". Black swan events, concerning financial events, were intro-
duced by Taleb (2001) in his book Fooled By Randomness: the hidden
role of chance in life and in the markets. This metaphor is used to
describe an event that (i) comes as a surprise, (ii) has a major effect,
and (iii) is often inappropriately rationalized after the fact with the
benefit of hindsight. The main idea in Taleb’s book is not to attempt
to predict black swan events, but to build robustness against negative
ones and be able to exploit positive ones. Specifically, he argues that
banks and trading firms are very vulnerable to black swan events and
are exposed to unpredictable losses. We note a similar though in the
bankers’ words: "I make no forecasts, only look at prices and just eval-
uate risk relative to opportunity, that’s all (e.g., a call option gives you
the upside and you have to see how to fund it, options-pricing)"and "I
am more interested in managing risk rather than predicting well, the
point of risk management is: after you crossed a threshold, give your
view up, for example, if you are right, you expect 5% gain and if you
are wrong, you expect -1.5% loss, so if you get to -1.5%, give up".
• Setting your investment horizon allows one to decide which kind of un-
certainty to focus on. More specifically, the interviewees acknowledged
that model uncertainty is more important than strategic uncertainty
in the long-term and vice versa: "In the long run, the model works,
but, in the short run, I also use other information (who’s buying, who’s
selling, etc.)", "In short run the quick money (e.g., hedge funds and
trading desks) dominates, in a 3-month perspective it matters what
big players (e.g., Pimco or Black Rock) are doing"and "Fundamentals
prevail, maybe not over 1-2 weeks but over 6-8 months".
• Almost half of investment bankers mentioned a particularly interest-
ing way of coping with model uncertainty. We label this coping way
acknowledge the value of disagreement. For instance, our participants
said: "If everybody around the table says the same, you should worry",
"If you have too much agreement, then it could very easily go the other
way"and "75% of the time, 10 out 12 dealers would agree, but they
are proved wrong". This result contradicts the no-trade theorems of
neoclassical economics where rational agents with identical informa-
tion and a-priori beliefs cannot possibly disagree (Milgrom & Stockey,
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1982). However, alternative theories (Brunnermeier et al., 2012) sug-
gest that disagreements among market participants is the norm in real
economies. Assuming that other market players have some biased be-
liefs — which they do, at least sometimes22 — then it is functional
for a banker to disagree with others and hence to value disagreement.
But we believe that the bankers’ acknowledgment of the value of dis-
agreement may have deeper roots. Unlike the central bank, in the
investment bank there is no institutionalized process of competition
among models. But investment bankers realize that the incorporation
of a balanced set of different viewpoints in prices may benefit all market
participants. Additionally, the simultaneous avoidance of groupthink
(Janis, 1982) and a continuos constructive criticism is considered an
upside: "There are groupthink problems"and "In my teams, I try to
mix a quant. model-driven guy with an experienced, less quant. guy".
5.2 Ways of coping with strategic uncertainty
Given that decisions by all agents play a crucial role in economics — and
in other social sciences as well — it is worth knowing who the other players
are and their respective strategies. A mix of news and opinions deriving
by other agents —for example received e-mails — draws the trader’s atten-
tion to a specific situation, to the exclusion of other market information,
and implicitly suggests how the information should be interpreted (Hardie
& MacKenzie, 2007). Here, we first analyze the coping ways that relate
to general game-theoretic considerations: make others predictable directly,
develop a theory of mind of others, determine the relevant players, reason
hypothetically about others and choose your level of reasoning or change the
rules of the game. Then, we discuss coping ways that are more specific to
banking: determine trend breaks from prices and communicate to others or
try to influence them. In standard game theory (Binmore, 2007), it is as-
sumed that intelligent players have rational preferences in a setup where
outcomes depend on the decisions by all agents, and that all players know
this, and so on. Moreover, standard game theory assumes that even if there
22Behavioral finance and economics literature has identified a set of psychological biases
that that distort people’s beliefs and decisions in various economic situations. See Brun-
nermeier et al. (2012); Hirshleifer (2001); Barberis & Thaler (2003); DellaVigna (2009) for
extensive reviews of the literature.
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is incomplete information, players share the conception of a situation, for
example the possible actions and players. As one would expect, however,
the conditions are not met in practice and bankers have to cope with the
strategic uncertainty coming from not knowing other minds, for all these
reasons it is worth to consider beliefs and beliefs about others’ beliefs.23
In general terms, making others predictable is an overarching way of cop-
ing with strategic uncertainty including different coping ways that can help
make others predictable, such as developing a theory of mind or thinking
hypothetically about others which involve thinking about others’ thinking;
and making others predictable directly as a separate category that we are
going to discuss.
• Different from the traditional approach, one way of coping is to make
other players predictable directly, without thinking about their think-
ing. Indeed, if I can make another player predictable, I can choose an
action that is in my best interest given that player’ s predicted action.
Interestingly, investment bankers have a multitude of ways to make
others predictable directly: "I put in a lot of small orders and then
cancel them [to find out about reactions of other players], you can do
this in Canada because there you can know all others’ orders"and "To
see whether or not a decision of a client is trend-breaking, that is, if the
client changes his overall strategy, you have to know the client well, if
one client is breaking his trend, then it is likely that other clients will
also break their trend". In general, investment bankers have detailed
notions on whether other players are predictable, and if yes, what one
can predict about them: "Australian banks are more unpredictable
than European banks, they have just four big banks but you do not
know which way they are going to push, their forwards are difficult to
anticipate while European banks always try to borrow dollars"and "It
all comes down to knowing your clients and how predictable they are".
• We found evidence that bankers develop a theory of mind of others as
in "I ask myself what the other players will finally price". Overall,
it seems that our participants have developed different techniques for
23See (Nagel, 1995) for an introduction to the Level-k model outlined to explain the
"beauty contest"game; (Rubinstein, 2007; Burchardi & Penczynski, 2010) for extensive
reviews on strategic thinking; and the experimental study conducted by Charness &
Dufwenberg (2006) for an example of how people care about other people’s beliefs.
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developing theories of mind. For instance, one banker stated "I try
to find out the others’ breadth of thinking". If a banker knows the
breadth of thinking of other market participants, s/he can infer what
the other agents will pay attention to and thus maybe also how they
will think and play. Furthermore, one investment banker said that he
tries to find "vulnerable points in other people’s thinking"by "playing
games with yourself mostly". He reported that he finds incidents were
he could conclude "even if they are right, they are overreacting". Other
techniques for developing theories of mind of others are more complex
and involve figuring out one’ s relative sophistication compared to other
players. For instance, take "if you cannot find the sucker on the poker
table, it’ s you". This technique seems to follow the reasoning that —
assuming that everyone tries to exploit everyone else and that there
are varying degrees of sophistication — if anyone can find someone
else who is less sophisticated than they are, they will exploit them.
Consequently, if I cannot exploit anybody, I must conclude that others
are more sophisticated than me and they are exploiting me.
• Determining the relevant players represents the basis for the core ways
discussed just above. Indeed, before one develops a theory of mind
of someone else or attempts to make them predictable directly, they
should make sure that the other party is relevant24. More than half
of investment bankers25 mentioned this coping way: "I think about
key players in the market, there are 30-40 big accounts that can make
a difference"and "You want to think about each of the big players
separately (there is just a few of them), such as Black Water and
Howard (big hedge funds)". Direct methods of determining relevant
players were reported: "To find out who the key players are, I read
and interview"and "You can never be sure if you have identified all key
players but it helps you if you are embedded in the system (e.g., Wall
Street)". Central bankers did not mention this coping way. Indeed, it
seemed that central bankers believed that they know who the relevant
players are.
24Information about what major categories of market actors are doing and sometimes
why they are doing is already mentioned in the interview data and observation by Hardie
& MacKenzie (2007).
25Determining the relevant players was almost exclusively mentioned by investment
bankers.
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• Almost half of investment bankers and a couple of central bankers
mentioned the coping way of thinking hypothetically about others. Dif-
ferent methods of theorizing about others emerged, such as: "I play
what-if scenarios to myself, it’ s like a tree, you have to put in proba-
bilities (back of the envelope calculations)", "I analyze other players,
by thinking how they will react under many different circumstances",
"I know that the customer (e.g., IBM pension fund) will call around
other banks, and I engage in an iterative game", "I try to find vul-
nerable points in the reasoning of others by client calls/meetings"and
"I reason through the logic of others". Although this coping way can
clearly help, it is worth noting that our participants mentioned less this
way, which uses thinking about others’ thinking, than taking actions
as a way of finding out about other players directly.
• One of the most interesting ways of coping with strategic uncertainty
we found is choosing your level of reasoning or changing the rules of
the game. Many economic problems are naturally modeled as a game
of incomplete information, where a player’s payoff depends on his own
action, the actions of others, and some unknown economic fundamen-
tals. Rational behavior in such environments clearly depends on a
player’s beliefs about economic fundamentals; but it also depends on
higher order beliefs, i.e., players’ beliefs about other players beliefs,
players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs about other players’ beliefs,
and so on. Allen & Morris (2001) discussed higher-order beliefs and
their relevance in finance concluding that higher order beliefs are a key
determinant of investors’ ability to co-ordinate their behavior.26 Our
interview data suggests that reasoning about others’ reasoning stops
at Level 2 (reasoning about others’ reasoning) or at most at Level 3
(reasoning about others’ reasoning about one’ s own reasoning). Theo-
retically, stopping at a particular level of reasoning could make players
exploitable by other players. However, our participants acknowledged
that no one will be infinitely rational: "Players want to be epsilon-
better than others (so that they can get a bonus), they do not follow
26Rational agents may observe different signals (i.e., there may be asymmetric informa-
tion) but it is assumed that their posterior beliefs could have been derived by updating a
common prior belief on some state space. In other words, it is assumed that all differences
in beliefs are the result of differences in information, not differences in prior beliefs.
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the whole infinite regress", and "Both the banks and the central bank
try to develop a theory of mind of others, but they do not go many
levels deep". Indeed, we argue that, on the face of uncertainty, stop-
ping at relatively low levels of reasoning can be functional. A central
banker said: "Investment banks choose risk weights so as to make bal-
ance sheets look like they meet capital requirements."Now, in a game
with fully rational players, the central bankers would have to think
about the investment banker’ s reasoning about the central bank’ s
reasoning about choosing risk weights in order to look like they meet
capital requirements. However, the central banker knows that the in-
vestment banker knows that the central banker would not know the
"correct"risk weights either. Rather than engaging in an iterative pro-
cess of reasoning, the central bankers could think about changes in the
definition of the game. For instance, one approach to solving the prob-
lem of risk weights is that every investment bank has to evaluate its
liabilities using the risk weights that other investment banks are using.
To take a second example, a central banker said: "The [investment]
banks try to guess your concern"and "make it look like they are cut-
ting lending."Again, instead of engaging in iterative reasoning, it may
make more sense to think through the details of how investment banks
accumulate risks and how regulation rules can be found that are clear
and cannot be gamed or at least it is clear whether they are gamed. In
sum, it could sometimes be more efficient and effective to change the
rules of the game rather than to think through all levels of reasoning.27
Changing the rules of the game may also be a way of avoiding conflict
over behaviors that may be construed as not pro-social (Dana et al.,
2006).
Now, we come to the ways of coping with strategic uncertainty that are more
specific to banking. We first analyze determining trend breaks from prices
and thencommunicating to others or trying to influence them.
• Our findings about determining trend breaks from prices show a large
variety of information about other players that can be extracted from
prices. A neoclassical view on markets suggests that prices contain
27It should be noted that this is the second way we found for coping with strategic
uncertainty that does not solely depend on thinking about others’ thinking.
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no strategic uncertainty; in practice, however, strategic uncertainty
seems to be greatly reduced by price observations. The language of
investment bankers illustrates that they read beliefs of other investors
from prices. They a variety of words that refer to higher order beliefs
such as "regime switches", "sentiments"or "trend breaks". In this case,
price changes are decomposed to extract actions of particular banks: "I
see a few things from LIBOR [London Interbank Offered Rate] rates,
and their changes (I do that because the forwards market is affected a
lot by the changes in the inter-bank rates), I drill down to make it more
granular". Here, the London Interbank Offered Rate — the average
rate of interest at which a panel of major banks report other banks
as being prepared to lend them funds in a particular currency for a
particular period — works as a benchmark. There are also technical
ways of extracting beliefs of other agents from prices as in "I use the call
volume weighted by the delta of the underlying option as an indicator of
sentiments". Reasoning about sentiments is reasoning about the beliefs
of other agents as Barberis et al. (1998) define investor sentiments as
"how investors form beliefs". If one market participant understands
well how other market participants form beliefs and understands when
this belief formation is biased, this market participant can exploit other
market participants. Finally, one investment banker noted: "I try
to observe a regime switching by listening to what clients say and a
change in the talk, knowing what traders observe (e.g., traders said
that everything was correlated with the euro), also when things start
breaking down". In sum, investment bankers exhibit a keen awareness
that a lot can be learned from price changes about other players. As
one put it, "When there is a credit spread, this means that there is a
buyer and a seller and they disagree, this is interesting because they
are probably not that stupid, so what’ s happening?"
• Finally, communicating to others or trying to influence them appeared
as a coping way specific to banking28. In theory, central banks try to
influence the expectations of all market participants; Woodford (2005)
talked of central banks as expectation coordinators. We found evidence
28Strictly speaking, a developing literature concludes that a high degree of transparency
about the future use of policy instruments might actually contribute more to financial
instability than to stabilization of the real economy (White, 2013).
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that central bankers are aware about this role: "Target interest rate
signals the bank’ s commitment", "The bank realizes that how they
explain a policy will have an impact, especially for surprising decisions,
so, the bank gives a lot of information (reports, minutes of meetings,
interviews on radio and TV) which, overall, is used well"and "The
staff communicate a bit to the public, the committee more; the pub-
lic responds a lot to the minutes, especially to the quantitative parts".
These utterances point to what M. Y. Abolafia (2010) calls sensegiving.
He argues that policy makers are deeply concerned with maintaining
control of their domain and with how their action will be interpreted.
In other words, their attention is on how their audience will react. It
should be noted that central bankers said that they aim at merely in-
forming the public, not influencing it: "The bank thinks about people’
s expectations but does not try to manipulate them, it would be a
dangerous game to play", and "We try to help people understand our
decision processes by giving them a lot of information". On the other
hand, investment bankers are open about their attempting to influence
investors: "We all go to equity research conferences and there is a lot
of interaction there", "You may, or not, communicate to your clients
your belief about the yen/dollar exchange rate"and "I spend most of
my time on verbal framing".
5.3 Summary of findings
In sum, we identified eleven ways of coping with model uncertainty (Table
3). The use of science was mentioned by the vast majority of interviewees
in both banks.29 Thus, a scientific approach seems to be at the core of
the banks’ coping with uncertainty. Although participants admit that they
could not, and do not, practice pure science; we found evidence that they
develop hypotheses and models, and test them with data. The major find-
ing in terms of ways of coping with model uncertainty is the importance of
narratives. Information about the state of the economy arrives continuously
(White, 2013), and narratives result to be particularly relevant in central
bankers, where the whole organization knows and integrates them with eco-
29In a sense the fact that a typical job in investment banks, beyond good communication
abilities and interpersonal skills, requires strong analytical skills and ability in manage,
organize and synthesize huge amounts of data could be interpreted as confirmation.
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nomic models to aid forecasting economic developments and making policy
decisions. The remaining nine coping ways were mentioned almost exclu-
sively by either investment or central bankers. We identified different kind
relation between coping ways. First, some coping ways are complementary
each other. For example, excessive trust on one’s intuition or heuristics
can be checked and revisited by exercising judgment. Second, some coping
ways are to a large extent prerequisites for others. For instance, causal in-
ference underlies making judgments and building theories. Overall, at the
risk of oversimplifying, we may call "individual"and "practical"the coping
ways mentioned in the investment bank; and "team-based"and "thinking"30
the coping ways mentioned in the central bank. We can justify the team-
based approach of the central bank by the bank’s need for shared cognition
(Hutchins, 1995; M. Y. Abolafia, 2010), which the investment bank may not
have.
We also identified seven ways of coping with strategic uncertainty (Table
4). Many economic decisions take place in contexts which require thinking
about others’ behavior and which are cognitively complex. Three coping
ways were mentioned by the vast majority of interviewees in both banks and
form a core: make others predictable directly; develop a theory of mind of
others; communicate to others or try to influence them. We interpret these
three core coping ways as suggesting that bankers realize the importance of
game-theoretic considerations, and — going beyond theory — take actions
in order to find out about other players, including changing the rules of the
game. This is a richer and more active approach than the one found for cop-
ing with model uncertainty, which at its core used thinking based on science
and the construction and evaluation of verbal narratives. This is important
because, as Lo (2004) has pointed out, action has been basically neglected
in standard economics and finance.
Finally, in Table 5 we summarize our results on model and strategic uncer-
tainty for both the investment and central bank.
30Defining "thinking"the coping ways adopted by investment banks we do not mean
that these coping ways are not practical.
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Table 5: A summary of the results (see Table 3 and 4) on model and strategic
uncertainty for the investment and central bank.
Investment Bank (work is
more individual)




Core coping way: Use scientific approach
Bank-specific copying ways
are primarily practical (e.g.,
manager risk rather than try
to predict; acknowledge the
value of disagreement)
Bank-specific coping ways
rely primarily on thinking
(e.g., draw analogies; con-




Core coping way: Make others predictable directly (e.g.,
without thinking about their thinking); Develop theory
of mind of others
Bank-specific copying ways
(e.g., determine trend breaks
from prices)
Bank-specific coping ways
(e.g., chose your level of rea-






The research results were presented and major findings reported in the
previous chapter. This Chapter provides some concluding remarks and im-
plications thereof, based on the main findings for the study. Starting with the
ways of coping with model uncertainty, we then move to discuss the ways
of coping with strategic uncertainty. Moreover some controversial results
and limitations of the study are highlighted. In the last Chapter research
conclusions and recommendations for future research are provided.
6.1 Major findings and implications
Founded on the traditional philosophical wondering of whether inductive
inference is legitimate31, the standard economic theorizing has focused on
deduction, or logic deduction. Whereas our findings make clear the impor-
tance of induction and abduction for coping with model uncertainty. White
(2013) notes theory without testing (pure deduction) and testing without
theory (pure induction) would seem to fall well short of the requirements of
the scientific method. Many definitions and supporting conclusions of induc-
tion have been elaborated so far32, but the one which better embraces the
purpose of the this work describes induction as "inferential processes that ex-
31Generally induction is defined as the kind of reasoning which try to get plausible con-
clusions based upon a collection of specific answers and observations. Because induction
involves uncertainty, it may introduce error.
32For example, Rescher (1980) offers a pragmatic justification of induction, arguing
that it is the best available means for accomplishing our cognitive ends. Induction usually
works, and even when it leads us into error, there is no method of thinking that would
work better.
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pand knowledge in the face of uncertainty"(Holyoak & Holland, 1989, p.1).
Instead we refer to Peirce (1955)’s abduction in M. Y. Abolafia (2010)’s
sense, that is, in order to describe how an economic model and a narrative
are adapted to each other and are integrated so as to combine the precision
of a mathematical model with the richness of a verbal discussion. Hansen &
Sargent (2008) suggest that model uncertainty be dealt with in a technical
way, by using control theory. We did not find evidence for this or simi-
lar approaches. Instead of developing more sophisticated technique, central
bankers developed their social cognition and organizational processes. It
seems that this approach has its niche. For example, take the financial crisis
of 2007-2008. Even in the most sophisticated DSGE models used at that
time, a financial crisis was, by construction, simply not possible. In group
discussions, however, contexts and refinements that are not included in mod-
els can be discussed. In sum, the construction and evaluation of narratives
may be more functional than technical approaches of coping with model un-
certainty33, assuming that the different verbal explanations of an economic
development are checked, by many participants with diverse backgrounds,
in terms of their logic and their implications. Figuring out the conditions
under which narratives are effective in copying with model uncertainty is
a key theoretical question. In this sense, more work should be done on
how different narratives and model predictions are, or should be, weighted
in committee decisions. We found rudimentary answers to this question in
our interviews: Narratives are scrutinized by challenging their logic and a
successful narrative also needs to have political appeal and enable the com-
mittee to act. It is crucial to model the process by which support for one
or another narrative accumulates (Tuckett et al., 2014). Finally, it is worth
noting that one of the ways of coping with model uncertainty we found in
line with new developments in economic theory. Nevertheless the effects of
disagreement are currently studied by several scholars such as Simsek (2013)
and Brunnermeier et al. (2012), the investigation of the conditions under
which disagreement has value is, to our knowledge, an understudied topic.
We now discuss strategic uncertainty. In the behavioral game theory lit-
erature, a major point of discussion is the level of reasoning of interacting
33A number of recent publications in the economic literature have shown that narratives
circulating in the economy may be important macroeconomic indicators (M. Y. Abolafia,
2010; Tuckett, 2011; Tuckett et al., 2014)
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players Nagel (1995). We found that bankers do not reason deeper than Lev-
els 2 or 3. One may tempted to see this as a failure of rationality but it is not
necessarily so. First, bankers may be taking a bet that even at Levels 2 or
3, they are more sophisticated than other players and thus can exploit them.
Second, a more effective way of coping with strategic uncertainty can be to
change the rules of the game, including taking clever actions that invite other
players to reveal their thinking. This way is sometimes available to central
bankers. A theory is badly needed that models and analyses the trade-offs
between these two ways of coping. We also found evidence that bankers of-
ten think about others’ relative sophistication and develop a theory of mind
of others. A theory of mind of another player can be developed by thinking
about the breadth of this player’s thinking or by reasoning through a situ-
ation using that player’s putative assumptions. These coping ways can be
studied theoretically by using epistemic game theory Brandenburger (2007)
and games with unawareness Heifetz et al. (2013). Finally, our findings on
strategic uncertainty have implications for the questionably strong assump-
tions underlying no-trade theorems of economics and the efficient financial
markets hypothesis. For example, if I believe that another agent will buy
an asset at a higher price in the future, I will buy today to have the option
to sell to this other agent later even if I believe that the asset is already
overvalued today (Xiong & Yan, 2010). In such situations, I may not even
need to form any beliefs about fundamental values. It is sufficient to form
a higher order belief about other agents’ beliefs and their likely reactions
in the near future since these beliefs and reactions will drive prices in the
short run. We found that investment bankers developed sophisticated ways
of reading information off prices that feeds into higher order beliefs. Indeed,
investors such as George Soros claim that they were hugely successful by
predicting belief dynamics of others (Soros, 2010). An interesting question
is whether strong and persistent individual differences do exist.
6.2 Controversial Results
We must limit our analysis to the data interview, as we lack of any
proof whether the interviewed bankers adopt or not the claimed strategies
in the wild. But, driven by previous literature (e.g., Tovar (2008); Offer-
man & Schotter (2009); White (2013)) and own doubt we try to distinguish
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and deduce from the interviews the metanarrative of the used heuristics34.
Recently, White (2013) — looking back at the evolution of the economic
structure and at the conduct of monetary policy over the last fifty years —
contends that the practice of monetary policy is far from a science: monetary
policy must be conducted within a political framework, which also constrains
the capacity to match theory with practice. Furthermore, he argues that one
reason why central banking practice and monetary theory have diverged is
that the real world is infinitely more complex and constraining than any
theoretical model can be. This brings us to the difference between doing and
thinking — a point hard to understand from the viewpoint of intellectuals.
Using (Taleb, 2012, p.230)’s words
As Yogi Berra said, "In theory there is no difference between
theory and practice; in practice there is."
We observed that the majority of interviewed bankers mentioned to use a
scientific approach, but analyzing more carefully bankers’ statements it is
worth to note the presence of some inconsistencies in their ideology. A di-
rect example is given by the utterance: "Statistical models are not believed
as long as there is no story". In a recent technical publication Hendry & Mi-
zon (2014) argue that crisis alter the predicted impacts of shocks and create
events whose effects cannot be calculated using standard mathematical tech-
niques. In particualr, the use of DSGE models in central banks has provoked
much heated discussion among bankers and scholars. Tovar (2008) consid-
ers DSGE models as powerful tools that provide a coherent framework for
policy discussion and analysis — they can help to identify sources of fluctu-
ations, answer questions about structural changes, forecast and predict the
effect of policy changes, and perform counterfactual experiments. Although
central banks have become increasingly interested in their usefulness for pol-
icy analysis, according to Tovar (2008) it remains to be seen whether these
models will be adopted in the core process of forecasting and policy analysis
frameworks, or whether they will only be employed as a supplementary tool
outside the core framework. In White (2013)’s view many central banks es-
timated DSGE models, but their relevance to actual policy decisions seems
to have been quite limited. According to Hendry & Mizon (2014) DSGE
34We already raised this issue in Section 3.3. For a heated television discussion among
financial markets’ traders see http://www.cnbc.com/id/101544772 .
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models take into account regular economic randomness, they are vulnerable
to "extrinsic unpredictability", that is, to probability outcomes that cannot
be calculated in advance. And in a crisis, economic agents and governments
change their plans, causing further shifts which are again not taken into ac-
count by DSGE models. While such changes have long been the downfall of
economic forecasts, the authors demonstrate how they cause DSGE model
analyses failure. A more sharply position is assumed by Noah Smith on his
blog35. He argues that "DSGE fails the market test". That is, financial
modelers who would benefit directly from superior market returns uniformly
do not use DSGE models, thus strongly suggesting that DSGE models are
not useful for macroeconomic prediction. In line to the discussion about
the use of a scientific approach and the use of forecast it’s worth to high-
light the following statement: "I make no forecasts, only look at prices and
just evaluate risk relative to opportunity, that’s all (e.g., a call option gives
you the upside and you have to see how to fund it; options-pricing)". Here,
this bankers expresses his interest in the risk-opportunity evaluation without
computing any forecast, i.e. knowing the probability distribution. But, is it
possible to make a risk-opportunity evaluation without knowing the prob-
ability distribution? This doubts wants to stress once again the continuos
mixing between the "rationalizing ideology"36 and heuristics which can not
be derived from a rational model. Other inconsistencies can be observed
when a banker said "In the long run, the model works, but, in the short run,
I also use other information (who’s buying, who’s selling, etc.)"; "In short
run the quick money (e.g., hedge funds and trading desks) dominates; in a
3-month perspective it matters what big players (e.g., Pimco or Black Rock)
are doing"; "Fundamentals prevail, maybe not over 1-2 weeks but over 6-8
months"means that bankers have learned that the equilibrium exists in a
theoretical terms . They assume that in the long run value of the hedge
funds will converge to the equilibrium; while the value rises and falls in
the short run, and these fluctuations depend on other market’s participants.
Bankers operates in the short run, they observe big players’ actions trusting
in their more and better knowledge. In this statement there is not a causal-
effect reasoning that prove the convergence of the value to the equilibrium
35The cited debate is available to the following webpage:
http://noahpinionblog.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/the-most-damning-critique-of-dsge.html
36We refer to a set of conscious and unconscious ideas and thoughts which justify your
rational goals, expectations and behavior.
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in 6-8moths, but this is assumed due to some unknown mechanism. Here,
bankers appear to be led by the illusion of control and an overconfidence.
For instance, Taleb (2012) shows a negative effect of the illusion of control.
He argues that overconfidence leads to reliance on forecasts, which causes
borrowing, then to the fragility of leverage. Further, there is convincing
evidence that a PhD in economics or finance causes people to build vastly
more fragile portfolios37. Our data interview— and also our observations —
make clear the relevant role assumed by the acknowledge of disagreement
among bankers and the institutionalization of group discussion especially for
central banks. At the same time, we observe the importance of knowing the
relevant market agents and, in general, what other players are doing. The
imitation of successful peers is often considered as an intelligent shortcut
to reduce individual learning costs. Concrete evidence for decision makers
falling into the trap of taking past success as a proxy for future performance
and ignoring sampling and selection processes is given by the two economists
Offerman & Schotter (2009). In their experiments participants tend to copy
the behavior of decision makers that took great risks and were lucky to
get the best possible outcome using a risky strategy with a lower expected
value than alternative strategies. Conversely to our idea of taking advan-
tage from the discussion of different opinions, the behavioral finance and the
neo-institutional sociology literatures support the behavioral tendencies to
imitate and herd or institutional pressures to conform (Beunza & Garud,
2004). Forecasting is an important activity for central banks. In May 2012,
the senior researcher Stockton (2012) was commissioned by the Court of the
Bank of England to conduct a review of the forecasting capability of the
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). That review encompassed the forecast
performance of the MPC, the analyses underlying the forecast, and processes
used to produce and communicate the forecast. In particular, he identifies
three functions of the forecast process at a central bank: (i) to present and
analyze the macroeconomic outlook; (ii) to provide a vehicle for considering
monetary policy tactics and strategies; and (iii) to communicate the outlook
for the economy and for monetary policy to the public. According to the
37George Martin and Nassim Taleb listed all the major financial economists who were
involved with funds, calculated the blowups by funds, and observed a far higher propor-
tional incidence of such blowups on the part of finance professors — the most famous
one being Long Term Capital Management, which employed Fragilistas Robert Merton,
Myron Scholes, Chi-Fu Huang, and others. (Taleb, 2012, p. 232-233)
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economists Bao et al. (2013) the payoff function for forecasters is decreasing
function of their prediction error. Both positive — which result in higher
market price — and negative shocks are equally penalizing for subjects per-
forming the prediction task as both types of shocks lead to higher prediction
errors38. To be not the outlier, bankers conform to a unique forecast. This
is a result of a potential embarrassment and loss of credibility deriving by a
own different forecast in the case it is not correct.
6.3 Limitations of the study
Our main conclusions let us to say that financial practitioners use adap-
tively different approaches to cope with uncertainty different from the proba-
bilistic one, at the same time a number of limitations and weakness following
the empirical research phase of the study and the reporting of the results
should be highlighted. Although there are many advantages of conducting
research interviews — such as their adaptability — the most obvious disad-
vantage is that they are time consuming, particularly if they are recorded
and fully transcribed, i.e. word for word. The analysis of the notes, the
introduction of clusters that represent in few words classes of similar utter-
ances — in almost their aspects — and the classification itself was the most
critical part. As first weakness, our recording and classifying of utterances39
can be criticized. Regardless of the type of the interview being coded or how
the information is to be used, according to (Gordon, 1992, ch.10) six essen-
tial steps define a coding process reliable. In order to check the reliability
and validity of our results, we compare them with what we did so far.
1. Define the coding categories: some coding categories are so obvious
and and simple, while others may present difficulties. If there is little
agreement on the number of responses that fall into a given category,
the definition of that category should be examined, discussed, and pos-
sibly revised. To solve the problems of having a too much abstract or
too much concrete definitions, a useful set of codings categories should
satisfy two basic logical characteristics: (a) it is all-inclusive if it in-
38See Ericsson (2008) for a taxonomy of the determinants of forecast error uncertainty
— where the forecast error, not the forecast, is uncertain.
39For more details about the method we used please see Section 4.3.
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cludes the entire range of relevant response categories in a particular
dimension; (b) it is mutually exclusive if each category in the set mak-
ing up the dimension must be defined clearly enough so that a concrete
example could not logically fall into two categories at the same time40.
2. Assign code labels to the categories, as we did.
3. Classify relevant information into the categories. The physical act of
classifying relevant information from the transcript could be done in
different valid ways. We read through the transcript, underline each
fragment of relevant information, and label each with the category
symbol, thereby classifying each relevant framing into the category it
falls (see Table 3 and Table 4).
4. Test the reliability of the coding, i.e. whether two or more independent
codings of material into categories relevant to the purposes of the inter-
view would be the same or whether they would vary grossly. To obtain
independent codings of the same material we used the independent-
coder method where two or more different people code the same mate-
rial independently. In this case the reliability is tested by doing a qual-
itative comparison of the independent codings to discover the amount
of agreement or disagreement between them, that is, we compare and
discuss their disagreements in order to improve their reliability in fu-
ture codings of the same type of material41. It is worth to note that
in the comparison of one independent coding with another one usually
there is a tendency to be over optimistic about relevance when coding
one’s own interview and to be shocked and amazed when one’s coding
partner does not agree about the meaning of some of the responses.
5. Measure the reliability of the coding. For example, the percentage
agreement score is a crude measure of reliability. It is simply the
percentage of information that was classified into the same category
by two independent coders. We have discussed all disagreements, and
agreements are shown in Table 3 and Table 4.
40Here interpretation is the key element, indeed considering different nuances some
utterances may belong to more than one category.
41Alternatively, the comparison could be quantitative, resulting in some type of numer-
ical score that express the degree of agreement.
65
6. Locate the sources of unreliability in the coding. There are three gen-
eral sources, or causes, of unreliability. Learning to reduce any or all of
these will raise the reliability coefficient. First, the coding categories
may be at fault either because they do not fit the information gath-
ered or they are not clearly enough defined to be mutually exclusive
and all-inclusive. Second, the information being coded may be am-
biguous, vague, unclear, contradictory, or confusing. In this case, the
interviewer may be at fault. Third, the coders may be at fault because
they do not understand the definitions, cannot read well, are illogical,
or not alert and motivated. 100% reliability is rare and unreliability is
due to some combination of these three causes.
Our work is still in progress and marginal refinements are going on. Indeed,
a continuous discussion have been conducted attempting to improve the cor-
respondence, but we are satisfied by the high degree of reliability we reached
in the whole process so far.
As second weakness, the sample size for our conducted interviews is relatively
small42 and may not be representative of a particular population. Since the
two interviewed groups were not randomly selected, but chosen as represen-
tative for each category, we can extend the empirical evidences to the whole
populations of investment and central banks. At the same time, one should
note that normally participants of the studies conducted in behavioral eco-
nomics and related fields normally are students; whereas our investigation
have focused on experts, a domain more difficult to achieve and communi-
cate with. Last, but not least, it is worth to wonder about the construction
of the model of the world. We initially distinguished two kind of uncertainty
that people face: the model uncertainty (MU) and the strategic uncertainty
(SU). But, is it possible to separate how the overall state of the economy
from others’ actions?43 For instance, the dynamic of market prices depends
on the fundamentals but also how people interpret them, react and exploit
each other. In other terms, the distinction between model uncertainty and
strategic uncertainty implies the existence of a model about how the world
is affected by fundamentals that is independent from what people do. This
specification should be interpreted as a transient state, it is not persistent.
4214 investment bankers and 8 central bankers were interviewed.
43Here, we support the idea that making others predictable directly, developing theory
of mind of others, and determining the relevant players spouse the scientific approach,
that is why this question must clearly be asked.
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Indeed, people can put more attention on the fundamentals (MU) on the
short run and on others’ behavior (SU) in the long run 44 or vice-versa. Fi-
nally, the distinction we made is useful if we want to obtain distinct results,
but simultaneously one should consider the overall state of the world.
44It is made more clear by the following statement: "In short run the quick money (e.g.,
hedge funds and trading desks) dominates; in a 3-month perspective it matters what big




In general terms, decision analysis would not be useful if our intuitive de-
cisions were always the best. Sometimes decision analysis is useful because
it simply gives us another way to think about decisions — even when we do
not carry out the whole analysis formally — and, it can also help us to avoid
certain systematic errors (Baron, 2000).
Starting from the obvious fact that cognition under uncertainty cannot al-
ways be reduced to thinking about risk, probability and games, we investi-
gated empirically the ways in which practitioners cope with uncertainty.
The primary objective of the study (Hypothesis 1) was to determine whether
bankers have developed a multitude of ways of coping with uncertainty that
go beyond probabilistic reasoning the whole set of ways. It could be seen
from Table 5 that — bankers use different ways to cope with uncertainty
referred to economic fundamentals such as a scientific approach as well as to
construct and evaluate of narratives, to draw analogies, to manage risk rather
than try to predict, and to acknowledge of disagreement. In a sense, this
last group is characterized by the use of interpretation rather than probabil-
ities. In addition, Table 5 shows that bankers take clever actions in order to
make other economic players predictable such as developing theory of mind
of others, but also make others predictable directly, that is without thinking
about others beliefs. Especially the last group of actions derive are the result
of spontaneous and not weighted by probabilities. All these considerations
support our first research hypothesis: bankers have developed a multitude
of ways of coping with uncertainty that go beyond probabilistic reasoning.
The second main object of the study (Hypothesis 2) was to determine whether
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bankers use their tools adaptively, trying to pick the right tool for the right
job. Previous research has shown that the same individual will often use
different strategies to make a decision, contingent on task demands (Payne,
1982)45. In this work it appears clear from Table 5 that ways to cope with
uncertainty were different in the investment bank from those in the cen-
tral bank, and different for coping with model uncertainty from coping with
strategic uncertainty. For example, because the central bank has to solve
a few but big problems (e.g., setting interest rates), central bankers have
developed shared cognition and use a more team-based approach than in-
vestment bankers. On the other hand, both investment and central bankers
relied more on a scientific modeling approach when uncertainty came from
economic fundamentals rather than from other players in the market. So, our
interview data supports our second research hypothesis: bankers use their
tools adaptively.
In sum, our study clearly suggests that a multi-disciplinary approach needs
to be taken in order to understand the cognition of bankers under uncer-
tainty. Our hope is that our empirical findings will be used for the building
of sound and relevant theory. Further experimental investigations are needed
to gain a better understanding of the behavior of markets participants; in
particular, a possible direction for future research would be to extend the
analysis of the set of methods, or "adaptive toolbox"— used by decision
makers — across their own education46 , experience, and learning from oth-
ers. For example, recent researches indicate that decision making may be
a teachable skill to obtain better life outcomes, especially in children and
adolescents (Baron, 2000) and in low social-economical status communities
(de Bruin et al., 2007).
45A major problem for current cognitive research is to be able to better understand and
predict when a particular strategy will be used.
46During the workshop on Continuing Education in Macroeconometrics, held at Uni-
versity of New South Wales, in November 2013; Professor James Morley supported the
central role of a continuous education about economic modelling and macroeconomic re-
search for central bankers. "Academics are increasingly taking leadership roles in central
banks - think Ben Bernanke or Janet Yellen. Also, a quick look at top academic journals
reveals many prominent publications by central banker researchers — such as Frank Smets
at the ECB,"and "Academic research can help central bankers to model the impact of ex-
pected future policy changes on the current economy, measure "economic slack" in modern





Thesis: Decision Strategies facing Uncertainty: Empirical
Evidence from an Investment and a Central Bank. Based on
Ehrig and Katsikopoulos’s research.
Student: Valentina Fani
The master thesis relies on the project designed in its entirety and com-
plexity by Professor Timo Ehrig and Professor Dr. Kostantinos Katsikopou-
los. In a successive phase of their project, I helped with the data codification
as a third independent coder. Whereas, in the methodological part, the inves-
tigation of bankers’ cognition has been presented as led by the two authors,
an explicit indication and reference of their study has been omitted. Here,
I provide the omitted information. I apologise for the inconvenience caused
by the inappropriate use of extant literature.
Chapter 1: Introduction
• On page 9: Taking the bounded rationality perspective, we offer a view
of the decision maker as an individual who has to consider both deci-
sion environments and personal limitations. Ehrig and Katsikopoulos
(2014) identify four different situations in which bankers face uncertain-
ties. Through the analysis of semi-structured interviews conducted in
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two leading investment and central banks by the two authors, differ-
ent ways of coping with uncertainty used by financial practitioners has
been identified. Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) suggest that expert
individuals, beside the use of a scientific approach, rely on analogies,
construct narratives, develop theory of mind of others, and choose
their own level of reasoning. Authors further provides empirical evi-
dence that bankers use their tools adaptively, "trying to pick the right
tool for the right job" (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.23).
Chapter 2: Bounded Rationality
• On page 14: "On one hand, proponents of unbounded rationality gener-
ally acknowledge that their models assume unrealistic mental abilities
accepting the difference between God, or Laplace’s superintelligence,
and mere mortals" (Gigerenzer et al. 1999, p9).
– "Humans must make inferences from behind a veil of uncertainty,
but God sees clearly; the currency of human thought is proba-
bilities, whereas God deals in certitude. On the other hand,
when it comes to how they think these uncertain inferences are
executed, those who believe in unbounded rationality paint hu-
mans in God’s image. God and Laplace’s superintelligence do
not worry about limited time, knowledge, or computational ca-
pacities." (Gigerenzer et al. 1999, p9).
• On page 15: "[...] decision makers have only a finite amount of time,
knowledge, attention, or money to spend on a particular decision. Lim-
ited search requires a way to decide when to stop looking for informa-
tion, that is, a stopping rule that optimizes search with respect to the
time, computation, money, and other resources being spent." (Gigeren-
zer et al. 1999, p10).
– "[...] this vision of rationality holds that the mind does calcu-
late the benefits and costs of searching for each further piece of
information and stop search as soon as the costs outweigh the
benefits." (Gigerenzer et al. 1999, p10).
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– "[...] optimization under constraints can require even more knowl-
edge and computation than unbounded rationality." (Gigerenzer
et al. 1999, p10).
• On page 16: However, setting an appropriate aspiration level and the
repeating the comparison of an option to the aspiration level until
a satisfactory course of action is found can require a large amount
of deliberation on the part of the decision maker. Most problems of
interest are computationally intractable, and this is why humans often
rely on heuristics (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). The term heuristics is of
Greek origin and means "serving to find out or discover". A heuristic is
a strategy that ignores part of the information to make decision faster,
more frugally, and/or more accurately than more complex methods
The goal of making judgements more quickly and frugally is consistent
with the goal of effort reduction, where frugally is often measured by
the number of cues that a heuristic searches (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).
– "Fast and frugal heuristics employ a minimum of time, knowl-
edge, and computation to make adaptive choices in real environ-
ments." (Gigerenzer et al. 1999, p.14).
Chapter 3: Decision Making
• On page 20: models of bounded rationality (e.g., Gigerenzer et al.
1999) typically specify three classes of processes to take decisions.
– "The process of search is modeled on step-by-step procedures,
where a piece of information is acquired, or an adjustment is
made (e.g., gaze heuristic: adapt running speed to keep the angle
of gaze constant), and then the process is repeated until it is
stopped." (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001, p8).
• On page 21: "After search is stopped and a limited amount of infor-
mation has been acquired, a simple decision rule is applied: a decision
or inference must be made. For example, we may choose an object on
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the base of the most important reason — rather than trying to com-
pute the optimal weights for all reasons, and integrating these reasons
in a linear or nonlinear fashion, as is done in computing a Bayesian
solution." (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001, p8).
• On page 22: example from Gigerenzer and Selten (2001). "A professor
[a philosopher] was struggling to decide whether to stay at Columbia
University or to accept a job offer from a rival university. A colleague
advised him: "Just maximize your expected utility — you always write
about doing this". Exasperated, the professor responded: "Come on,
this is serious"." (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001, p.9).
• On page 24: Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011)’ conceptualization of
"less can be more"
Chapter 4: Empirical Evidence from an investment and a cen-
tral bank: adaptive toolbox?
• On page 27: Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s research builds on prior
works (e.g., Gigerenzer and Selten (2001); Lo (2004); March (1994)).
Such pillars include Gigerenzer and Selten (2001)’s adaptive toolbox,
Lo (2004)’ call for for a new kind of rationality in finance in "The adap-
tive markets hypothesis". Empirical studies on the toolbox of financial
practitioners investigate corporate leaders (Maidique, 2011), technol-
ogy strategists (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011), central bankers (M.
Y. Abolafia, 2010), overlooking bankers’ adaptive toolbox. To our
knowledge, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) provide the first empirical
evidence on the toolbox of bankers for coping with uncertainty.
• On page 28: Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) identify four different
situations in which bankers face problems where uncertainty cannot
be fully handled by probability: (i) economic theories are contradicted
by reality and it is not clear how to revise them, (ii) there needs to
be consensus on making forecasts and policy decisions but team mem-
bers disagree, (iii) information about other players has to be extracted
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from prices, and (iv) the relevance of other players and their possible
reactions are not known.
– "These four problems are not randomly chosen, but they refer
to two important kinds of uncertainty. The first type, model
uncertainty, occurs because the economic world is complex and
no market participant knows the true probabilistic model of an
economic development." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.5).
– The second class, strategic uncertainty, "comes from the fact
that a market participant does not always know who the other
key players are or what their actions may be. But a market par-
ticipant needs this knowledge because, for instance, the actions
of key players in the market influence price movements in the
short and medium run." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.5).
– Without denying the probability relevance, Ehrig and Katsikopou-
los (2014) suppose that the toolbox of laypeople and finance pro-
fessionals comprehends a large set of tools.
– It is essential to know "the contents of the toolbox and the
way they combine for coping with uncertainty." (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014, p.2).
– To investigate bankers’ cognition under uncertainty Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos (2014) develop the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 : "The toolbox of bankers for coping with problems
of cognition under uncertainty includes other coping ways
beyond probabilistic reasoning." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos,
2014, p.5).
Hypothesis 2 : "The coping ways in the bankers’ toolbox for
problems of cognition under uncertainty serve complemen-
tary functions and are used adaptively." (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014, p.6).
• On page 29: In their study, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) use differ-
ent data sources including: (1) qualitative and quantitative data from
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the interviews, (2) observations during the on-site visits, (3) emails and
phone calls for preparing the interviews and filling gaps in accounts af-
ter the interviews, (4) archival data such as press releases and reports
published by the banks.
• On page 30, Table 1: Information on the two banks and interviews.
From Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014, p.28)
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, "the primary data
source consists in semi-structured interviews lasting 30-60 min-
utes. 25 individuals, of which 14 in the investment bank and 8
in the central bank (and 3 other workers in the financial sector
in a pilot study), were interviewed." (p.4).
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study interviewed people
vary in: "length of experience (from one to twenty-five years),
domain of expertise (from algorithmic trading to lobbying with
policy makers), job responsibility (from technical analysis to par-
ticipation in a monetary policy committee)" (p.4).
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, no "recording de-
vices or other electronic/computing equipment" (p.4) were used
to maintain an informal atmosphere that can encourage the re-
spondent to be open and honest. Two fieldworkers [Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos]: the first person charged with the direction of the
interview "went over a list of questions on cognition under un-
certainty, adapting the questions and adjusting direction as the
interview is taking place; while the second person took notes"
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.4).
• On page 31, Table 2. From Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014, p.28).
– "In addition, interviewees [in Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s
study] were also asked to talk about their expertise and job and
about how they cope with uncertainty, so that eventually the
interview centered on these issues. Questions were asked in a
non-suggestive manner." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.5).
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– To describe the different coping ways, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos
propose their own labels. Labels that were not used verbatim
by the interview participants. In particular, the two authors
"clustered similar utterances and associated labels capturing the
essential idea of these groups of similar utterances." (Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.6).
• On page 32, Table 3. From Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014, p.29).
• On page 35, Table 4. From Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014, p.31).
Chapter 5: Findings and analysis
• On page 38: "Even though Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s find-
ings are qualitative, they have precise enough form so that they can
be used in quantitative theories developed in disciplines such as eco-
nomics, finance and psychology." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.3).
As suggested by the two authors [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos], to gain un-
derstanding of how people cope — or should cope — with uncertainty
requires a multidisciplinary approach employing different disciplines
such as cognitive science, personality psychology, sociology and epis-
temic game theory.
– Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) show that "practicing bankers
use other coping ways beyond probabilistic reasoning (see Hy-
pothesis 1). Our [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] results show that
bankers rely on a multitude of coping ways, or as they are also
called heuristics or rules of thumb (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974;
Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011). As Gigerenzer and Selten (2001)
put it, the minds of the bankers resemble an adaptive toolbox.
This idea is not entirely new (Lo, 2004; King, 2005) but we [Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos] are not aware of other empirical studies of
the bankers’ toolbox, in particular for coping with uncertainty"
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.6).
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– Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "also show that the coping ways
are used in a complementary fashion and adaptively (see Hypoth-
esis 2). Below, we [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] first discuss ways
of coping with model uncertainty and then ways of coping with
strategic uncertainty. The discussion of each coping way centers
on trying to understand its function, that is, how it helps to rea-
son or decide under uncertainty. We [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos]
also comment on whether a coping way is more prevalent in one
of the two banks and speculate on why this is so." (Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.7)
• On page 39: In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, "over two
thirds of investment bankers and almost all central bankers mentioned
the coping way of using a scientific approach, developing hypotheses
and models and testing them with data." (p.7)
– "Given that participants are mostly trained in economics and fi-
nance or in other sciences such as physics and computer science,
one should expect this first result. Even if the market is noto-
riously difficult to understand, it may be a reasonable reaction
to try to understand it scientifically. In effect, participants af-
firmed to frequently rely their work on mathematical models such
as Black-Scholes equations, dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) models or statistical regressions" (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014, p.7)
– "An interesting issue is how the scientific approach works in the
practice of banking. As not every possible hypothesis can be
tested, bankers clearly make choices about which few hypothe-
ses to consider. For example, one participant said "A hypothesis
could be that an observed sample is an outlier, another hypoth-
esis could be that the market is bull" and another one said "I
test models under worst-case scenarios". In sum, participants [in
Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study] seemed to be sensitive
to the fact that selecting hypotheses is central to making rea-
sonable inductions. More generally, interviewees [in Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study] seemed to have a realistic view of
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the kind of science they could practice in their job. One said:
"Monetary economics is halfway between sociology and physics".
This may mean that approximate and qualitative reasoning is
used as in the following quote: "Let’s say that it is 50-50 whether
the market goes up or down, I try to reason about the relevant
conditional probabilities and associated variances and their gradi-
ents". In the investment bank, hypotheses were generated either
by individuals or small teams, but no hypothesis was known by
the whole investment bank. Conversely, in the central bank many
hypotheses appear to be built and tested by large teams and some
hypotheses are known and discussed in the whole organization."
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.7)
• On page 40: In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’ study more than half
of central bankers and only one investment banker mentioned the in-
stitutionalization of group discussions. "Central bankers made it clear
that group discussions are an integral part of their organizational cul-
ture: "The committee offers feedback, sometimes there is a mistake,
sometimes they offer technical advice (not during committee meetings,
however). The relationship of the research staff with the monetary
policy committee can be like student/supervisor or patient/doctor —
both roles are possible", "The role of the staff is to give the committee
hypotheses to consider and to help the committee to understand infor-
mation" and "We come up with worse case scenarios by sitting down
and thinking of something bad, consistent with past problems such as
Japan in the 1970s but believable, and reach consensus about what will
happen"." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.8)
– According to Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "this result makes
sense because the central bank has a small number of big goals
— such as how to set the interest rates, how to decide whether
financial stability risks are elevated or not and what policy re-
sponse is most appropriate — for which it needs shared cognition
(Hutchins, 1995)." (p.8).
– According to Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "investment bankers
focus on generating value for the stakeholders, essentially in any
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way that works. This is a first evidence that work in the invest-
ment bank is almost individual whereas it is much more team-
based in the central bank; this property is also identified in the
discussion of other findings [by Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)].
Consistently, M. Y. Abolafia (2010) argues that in policy groups
such as central banks, cognition and knowledge exist at a supra-
individual level and there is a shared sense of which actions are
appropriate. Another difference between the two banks organizes
the discussion of the remaining ways of coping with model uncer-
tainty. The central bankers said that they use what we [Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos] may call primarily a thinking approach, report-
ing the following ways: construct narratives and evaluate them,
use heuristics to work with data and models, make judgments,
use mental simulation and causal inference and draw analogies.
The investment bankers said that they use what we [Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos] may call primarily a practical approach, reporting
the following ways: manage risk rather than try to predict, set
your investment horizon, use intuition and introspection and ac-
knowledge the value of disagreement." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos,
2014, p.8).
• On page 41: Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "discuss the coping ways
mentioned almost exclusively by central bankers. Constructing nar-
ratives and evaluating them appeared to be very important for the
central bank. The role of narratives in financial behavior has been
discussed by Tuckett (2011)" (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.9).
– "as shown in the following quotes by participants [in Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study]: "Committee members prefer nar-
ratives, even at the cost of worse predictions", "Statistical models
are not believed as long as there is no story" and "Build a nar-
rative for each forecast"." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.9)
– As suggested by Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014), different func-
tions of narratives highlight their relevant role.
– Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) emphasize that "policy makers,
such as the members of the central bank’ s monetary policy com-
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mittee, have the duty to explain in an easy terms their decisions
to the public, politicians and the government and thus need to
have narratives at their disposal." (p.9)
– "Narratives are a device for managing the complex processes op-
erating in a central bank. In total, hundreds of technical staff are
employed at the bank and different fractions of it give input to
different committees responsible (e.g., monetary policy or finan-
cial stability). Narratives — with their organized thoughts and
experiences — facilitate the discussions of the committee mem-
bers with each other as well as with the staff and support the
eventual convergence to a working understanding or a decision."
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.10)
– "Narratives have a strong and productive interplay with eco-
nomic models. Each model highlights some aspects of the eco-
nomic world but no single model captures its totality. Thus,
within the central bank or even within teams of the central bank,
predictions and policy implications of different models often con-
tradict each other" (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.10).
– Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "found that in order to solve
these contradictions, central bankers back models with narra-
tives, that is they assemble the assumptions and predictions of
a particular model into a story. This also works vice versa: sto-
ries about economic developments are backed by models, that
is models are found which are consistent with the assumptions
and consequences in a particular story. As one central banker
noted: "You cross-check a narrative with broad enough class of
economic models". Abolafia (2010) uses the term abduction to
describe how the precision of an economic model and the richness
of narrative are adapted to each other." (Ehrig and Katsikopou-
los, 2014, p.10)
– "Instead of particular models or their predictions, narratives com-
pete in the process of making policy decisions. This process is
institutionalized within the central bank as the following quote
illustrates: "The staff builds up a narrative and the committee re-
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solves a contradiction [between the narrative of the staff and their
own narrative], if there are contradictions, you challenge the un-
derlying narrative"." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.10)
• On page 42: ""Example of a story that has been replaced by another
one (the first story was accepted by the committee in Jan. 2012 and
replaced in May 2012): the first story predicts that by the end of 2012,
inflation is back to under 2%, the second story was that inflation will be
closer to 3%, note that the statistical models predicted the latter. The
first story was that the significant slack in labor market should put pay
pressure down and this should lead to low inflation. The staff wanted
to persuade the committee about the prediction of the statistical models
and generated a story: if you believe that inflation will be down to 1.8%
then you have to believe that other components in the consumer basket
will go down by unusual amounts"." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014,
p.11).
– As suggested by Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "This example
illustrates that narratives are compared by means of logic. This
comparison is possible if narratives are backed by models since
models have logical consistency. In the central bank, logical con-
sistency is a norm: "Logical consistency is definitely a must for
acceptance of an explanation" and "A good narrative has to have
flawless logic, political appeal and market the bank’ s response"."
(p.11).
• On page 43: In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study "All central
bankers mentioned heuristics to work with data and models as in these
quotes: "There is no scientific evidence yet about how well their own
models of the transmission mechanism work, they were developed by
using rules of thumb (example: setting the money multiplier, gave
arguments of why it would be more than 1 (if the quantitative easing
actions lead banks to lend more) and why it would be less (if we bought
bonds of the banking sector))"and "In a first round we settled on 0.7,
in a second round some people believed in different money multiplier"."
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.11)
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– Although heuristics can be useful in the financial sphere, es-
pecially for fast reactions to new challenges, they can also get
decision-makers lost (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011).
– One needs to exercise judgment about whether to rely on heuris-
tics or not, as in the following quote in Ehrig and Katsikopoulos
(2014)’s study: "A simple rule like no leverage ratio larger than
10% would not work because risks would be off-loaded to unregu-
lated institutions such as hedge funds"." (p.11).
• On page 44: In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study "Making judg-
ments was mentioned by half of central bankers [...] who indicated
judgments as central assumptions to put in models. It appeared to
us [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] that judgments may be more than that,
as the following quote suggests: "The monetary policy committee en-
tertains high-level discussions, it makes some key judgments and the
staff works on them, for example, it is likely that euro-zone risks per-
sist, there is a low financial stability risk, no big moves in commodity
prices, and a judgment about the outlook for prices in general". In
any case, judgments are key because they filter unimportant informa-
tion out and help focus on what is really important. On the other
hand, judgments could also lead to bad decisions. Another coping way
mentioned only by central bankers is drawing analogies." (Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.12)
– Analogical reasoning is important in both economics and finance
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014).
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study "A couple of bankers
mentioned it: "Sit down and think of something bad, consistent
with past problems but something that people could believe, and
reach consensus, for example, going back to severe recessions such
as in Japan or in the 70’ s when there was a sharp fall of individ-
ual output, which led to contractions, V-shaped or U-shaped" and
"During the early part of financial crisis, they may form expecta-
tions from other recessions, by using analogy as in, for instance,
what happened to labor market in 90s, by recession hysteresis".
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These quotes clearly show that analogies can support inductive
reasoning.
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study "however, analogies
were used almost exclusively by central bankers. This may be be-
cause the construction and use of analogies is a complex process
that can require a significant investment of resources which are
perhaps scarce in investment banking. Supporting this idea, an
equity analyst noted: "I avoid using analogies, as they increase
the potential for disagreement"." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014,
p.12).
• On page 45: Using causal inference and mental simulation people hy-
pothesize that one variable causes another variable (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014).
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study "For instance, one se-
nior manager in fixed-income financial products said: "The most
important thing about a model is knowing when it won’ t work.
For example, if the bid-ask spread exceeds 15 basis points means
that you cannot use a standard pricing model". This utterance
is consistent with her going through the following causal infer-
ences: If bids and offers differ too much, it means that prices
do not equilibrate; and if prices do not equilibrate, the standard
models which are based on the assumption of market clearing do
not apply. Another of our [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] interviewees
explicitly mentioned mental simulation: "I use hypotheticals: if
this happens, then this will happen as well, and then..." (Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.13).
– "We [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] now turn to the four ways of
coping with model uncertainty which were only mentioned by
investment bankers (approximately from one-third to one-half of
them)." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.13).
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study "the last three ways
of coping with model uncertainty mentioned only by investment
bankers are very ingenuous. These coping ways accept that
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model uncertainty makes it almost impossible to do some things
and concentrate on the things that can actually be done." (Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.14).
• On page 46: In particular, introspection appears to be guided by the
willingness to improve (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014) as in the follow-
ing quote in Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study: "Every morning
I ask myself why I am on this" and "Try to find out what you are
not thinking about". One could argue that asking such questions could
have been the consequence of humility or self-awareness, but these
traits don’t characterize all the interviewed investment managers: "I
know what the right price is, that’ s why they pay me the big bucks"."
In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, interviewees showed trust
on intuition as when saying: "Some people are good at recognizing
patterns" (p.13).
– In their study Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) suggest that, us-
ing rules based on managing risk rather than trying to predict,
investment manager implicitly accept that they cannot anticipate
the market because of its irreducibly uncertain.
• On page 47: "in the bankers’ words: "I make no forecasts, only look
at prices and just evaluate risk relative to opportunity, that’s all (e.g.,
a call option gives you the upside and you have to see how to fund it,
options-pricing)" and "I am more interested in managing risk rather
than predicting well, the point of risk management is: after you crossed
a threshold, give your view up, for example, if you are right, you expect
5% gain and if you are wrong, you expect -1.5% loss, so if you get to
-1.5%, give up". Setting your investment horizon allows one to decide
which kind of uncertainty to focus on. More specifically, the intervie-
wees [in Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study] acknowledged that
model uncertainty is more important than strategic uncertainty in the
long-term and vice versa: "In the long run, the model works, but, in the
short run, I also use other information (who’s buying, who’s selling,
etc.)", "In short run the quick money (e.g., hedge funds and trading
desks) dominates, in a 3-month perspective it matters what big players
(e.g., Pimco or Black Rock) are doing" and "Fundamentals prevail,
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maybe not over 1-2 weeks but over 6-8 months". Almost half of invest-
ment bankers [in Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study] mentioned
a particularly interesting way of coping with model uncertainty. We
[Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] label this coping way acknowledge the value
of disagreement. For instance, our participants [in Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos (2014)’s study] said: "If everybody around the table says
the same, you should worry", "If you have too much agreement, then
it could very easily go the other way" and "75% of the time, 10 out
12 dealers would agree, but they are proved wrong". This result con-
tradicts the no-trade theorems of neoclassical economics where ratio-
nal agents with identical information and a-priori beliefs cannot possi-
bly disagree (Milgrom and Stockey, 1982)." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos,
2014, p.14).
• On page 48: "alternative theories (Brunnermeier et al., 2012) sug-
gest that disagreements among market participants is the norm in real
economies. Assuming that other market players have some biased be-
liefs — which they do, at least sometimes — then it is functional for a
banker to disagree with others and hence to value disagreement. But
we [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] believe that the bankers’ acknowledg-
ment of the value of disagreement may have deeper roots. Unlike the
central bank, in the investment bank there is no institutionalized pro-
cess of competition among models. But investment bankers realize that
the incorporation of a balanced set of different viewpoints in prices may
benefit all market participants. Additionally, the simultaneous avoid-
ance of groupthink (Janis, 1982) and a continuous constructive criti-
cism is considered an upside: "There are groupthink problems" and "In
my teams, I try to mix a quant. model-driven guy with an experienced,
less quant. guy"." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.15).
– In their study, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "first analyze the
coping ways that relate to general game-theoretic considerations:
make others predictable directly, develop a theory of mind of oth-
ers, determine the relevant players, reason hypothetically about
others and choose your level of reasoning or change the rules of
the game. Then, we [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] discuss coping
ways that are more specific to banking: determine trend breaks
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from prices and communicate to others or try to influence them.
In standard game theory (Binmore, 2007), it is assumed that in-
telligent players have rational preferences in a setup where out-
comes depend on the decisions by all agents, and that all players
know this, and so on. [...] Moreover, standard game theory as-
sumes that even if there is incomplete information, players share
the conception of a situation, for example the possible actions
and players. [...] As one would expect, however, the conditions
are not met in practice and bankers have to cope with the strate-
gic uncertainty coming from not knowing other minds" (Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.17).
• On page 49: According to Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014), "one way of
coping is to make other players predictable directly, without thinking
about their thinking. Indeed, if I can make another player predictable,
I can choose an action that is in my best interest given that player’ s
predicted action." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 17).
– Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) show that "investment bankers
have a multitude of ways to make others predictable directly: "I
put in a lot of small orders and then cancel them [to find out
about reactions of other players], you can do this in Canada be-
cause there you can know all others’ orders" and "To see whether
or not a decision of a client is trend-breaking, that is, if the client
changes his overall strategy, you have to know the client well, if
one client is breaking his trend, then it is likely that other clients
will also break their trend". In general, investment bankers have
detailed notions on whether other players are predictable, and
if yes, what one can predict about them: "Australian banks are
more unpredictable than European banks, they have just four big
banks but you do not know which way they are going to push,
their forwards are difficult to anticipate while European banks al-
ways try to borrow dollars" and "It all comes down to knowing
your clients and how predictable they are". We [Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos] found evidence that bankers develop a theory of mind
of others as in "I ask myself what the other players will finally
price". Overall, it seems that our participants [in Ehrig and Kat-
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sikopoulos (2014)’s study] have developed different techniques
for developing theories of mind. For instance, one banker stated
"I try to find out the others’ breadth of thinking". If a banker
knows the breadth of thinking of other market participants, s/he
can infer what the other agents will pay attention to and thus
maybe also how they will think and play. Furthermore, one in-
vestment banker [in Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study] said
that he tries to find "vulnerable points in other people’s thinking"
by "playing games with yourself mostly". He reported that he
finds incidents were he could conclude "even if they are right,
they are overreacting". Other techniques for developing theories
of mind of others are more complex and involve figuring out one’
s relative sophistication compared to other players. For instance,
take "if you cannot find the sucker on the poker table, it’ s you.""
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 18).
• On page 50: "everyone tries to exploit everyone else and that there
are varying degrees of sophistication — if anyone can find someone
else who is less sophisticated than they are, they will exploit them.
Consequently, if I cannot exploit anybody, I must conclude that others
are more sophisticated than me and they are exploiting me." (Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 18).
– "Indeed, before one develops a theory of mind of someone else or
attempts to make them predictable directly, they should make
sure that the other party is relevant" (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos,
2014, p. 19).
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, "More than half of
investment bankers mentioned this coping way: "I think about
key players in the market, there are 30-40 big accounts that can
make a difference" and "You want to think about each of the big
players separately (there is just a few of them), such as Black
Water and Howard (big hedge funds)" (p. 19).
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, methods of deter-
mining relevant players were reported: ""To find out who the
key players are, I read and interview" and "You can never be
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sure if you have identified all key players but it helps you if you
are embedded in the system (e.g., Wall Street)". Central bankers
did not mention this coping way. Indeed, it seemed that central
bankers believed that they know who the relevant players are."
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 19).
• On page 51: In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, "Almost half of
investment bankers and a couple of central bankers mentioned the cop-
ing way of thinking hypothetically about others. Different methods of
theorizing about others emerged, such as: "I play what-if scenarios to
myself, it’ s like a tree, you have to put in probabilities (back of the enve-
lope calculations)", "I analyze other players, by thinking how they will
react under many different circumstances", "I know that the customer
(e.g., IBM pension fund) will call around other banks, and I engage
in an iterative game", "I try to find vulnerable points in the reasoning
of others by client calls/meetings" and "I reason through the logic of
others". Although this coping way can clearly help, it is worth noting
that our participants [in Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study] men-
tioned less this way, which uses thinking about others’ thinking, than
taking actions as a way of finding out about other players directly. One
of the most interesting ways of coping with strategic uncertainty we
found is choosing your level of reasoning or changing the rules of the
game." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 19).
– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, "interview data sug-
gests that reasoning about others’ reasoning stops at Level 2
(reasoning about others’ reasoning) or at most at Level 3 (rea-
soning about others’ reasoning about one’ s own reasoning). The-
oretically, stopping at a particular level of reasoning could make
players exploitable by other players. However, participants [in
Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study] acknowledged that no
one will be infinitely rational: "Players want to be epsilon better
than others (so that they can get a bonus), they do not follow the
whole infinite regress", and "Both the banks and the central bank
try to develop a theory of mind of others, but they do not go many
levels deep". Indeed, we [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] argue that,
on the face of uncertainty, stopping at relatively low levels of
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reasoning can be functional. A central banker said: "Investment
banks choose risk weights so as to make balance sheets look like
they meet capital requirements". Now, in a game with fully ra-
tional players, the central bankers would have to think about the
investment banker’ s reasoning about the central bank’ s reason-
ing about choosing risk weights in order to look like they meet
capital requirements. However, the central banker knows that
the investment banker knows that the central banker would not
know the "correct" risk weights either. Rather than engaging in
an iterative process of reasoning, the central bankers could think
about changes in the definition of the game. For instance, one
approach to solving the problem of risk weights is that every in-
vestment bank has to evaluate its liabilities using the risk weights
that other investment banks are using. To take a second exam-
ple, a central banker said: "The [investment] banks try to guess
your concern" and "make it look like they are cutting lending."
Again, instead of engaging in iterative reasoning, it may make
more sense to think through the details of how investment banks
accumulate risks and how regulation rules can be found that are
clear and cannot be gamed or at least it is clear whether they are
gamed. In sum, it could sometimes be more efficient and effective
to change the rules of the game rather than to think through all
levels of reasoning. Changing the rules of the game may also be
a way of avoiding conflict over behaviors that may be construed
as not pro-social (Dana et al., 2006)." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos,
2014, p. 20).
• On page 52: In their study, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos "come to the ways
of coping with strategic uncertainty that are more specific to banking.
We [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] first analyze determining trend breaks
from prices." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 21).
– "a neoclassical view on markets suggests that prices contain how-
ever, strategic uncertainty seems to be greatly reduced by price
observations. The language of investment bankers illustrates that
they read beliefs of other investors from prices." (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014, p. 21).
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– They a variety of words that "refer to higher order beliefs such as
"regime switches", "sentiments" or "trend breaks"." (Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 21).
– "In this case, price changes are decomposed to extract actions
of particular banks: "I see a few things from LIBOR [London
Interbank Offered Rate] rates, and their changes (I do that be-
cause the forwards market is affected a lot by the changes in the
inter-bank rates), I drill down to make it more granular"." (Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 21).
– "There are also technical ways of extracting beliefs of other agents
from prices as in "I use the call volume weighted by the delta of
the underlying option as an indicator of sentiments". Reasoning
about sentiments is reasoning about the beliefs of other agents
as Barberis et al. (1998) define investor sentiments as "how in-
vestors form beliefs". If one market participant understands well
how other market participants form beliefs and understands when
this belief formation is biased, this market participant can exploit
other market participants. Finally, one investment banker [in
Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study] noted: "I try to observe
a regime switching by listening to what clients say and a change
in the talk, knowing what traders observe (e.g., traders said that
everything was correlated with the euro), also when things start
breaking down". In sum, investment bankers [in Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos (2014)’s study] exhibit a keen awareness that a lot
can be learned from price changes about other players. As one
put it, "When there is a credit spread, this means that there is
a buyer and a seller and they disagree, this is interesting because
they are probably not that stupid, so what’ s happening?"" (Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 21).
• On page 53: "Finally, communicating to others or trying to influence
them appeared as a coping way specific to banking" (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014, p. 22).
– "In theory, central banks try to influence the expectations of all
market participants; Woodford (2005) talked of central banks as
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expectation coordinators. We [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] found
evidence that central bankers are aware about this role: "Target
interest rate signals the bank’ s commitment", "The bank realizes
that how they explain a policy will have an impact, especially for
surprising decisions, so, the bank gives a lot of information (re-
ports, minutes of meetings, interviews on radio and TV) which,
overall, is used well" and "The staff communicate a bit to the
public, the committee more; the public responds a lot to the min-
utes, especially to the quantitative parts". These utterances point
to what M. Y. Abolafia (2010) calls sensegiving." (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014, p. 22).
– As suggested by Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014), it should be
noted that central bankers said that they aim at merely inform-
ing the public, not influencing it: ""The bank thinks about people’
s expectations but does not try to manipulate them, it would be
a dangerous game to play", and "We try to help people under-
stand our decision processes by giving them a lot of information".
On the other hand, investment bankers are open about their at-
tempting to influence investors: "We all go to equity research
conferences and there is a lot of interaction there", "You may, or
not, communicate to your clients your belief about the yen/dollar
exchange rate" and "I spend most of my time on verbal fram-
ing"." (p. 22).
• On page 54: In sum, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "identified eleven
ways of coping with model uncertainty (Table 3). The use of science
was mentioned by the vast majority of interviewees in both banks." (p.
16).
– "Thus, a scientific approach seems to be at the core of the banks’
coping with uncertainty." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.
16).
– "they [participants in Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study]
could not, and do not, practice pure science" (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014, p. 16).
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– In Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study, "The major finding in
terms of ways of coping with model uncertainty is the importance
of narratives." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p. 16).
– "in central bankers, where the whole organization knows and in-
tegrates them with economic models to aid forecasting economic
developments and making policy decisions. The remaining nine
coping ways were mentioned almost exclusively by either invest-
ment or central bankers." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.
16).
– Some coping ways are complementary each other (Ehrig and Kat-
sikopoulos, 2014)
– "For instance, causal inference underlies making judgments and
building theories. Overall, at the risk of oversimplifying, we
[Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] may call "individual" and "practical"
the coping ways mentioned in the investment bank; and "team-
based" and "thinking" the coping ways mentioned in the central
bank. We [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] can justify the team based
approach of the central bank by the bank’s need for shared cog-
nition (Hutchins, 1995; M. Y. Abolafia, 2010), which the invest-
ment bank may not have." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.
16).
• On page 55: In their study, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos "also identi-
fied seven ways of coping with strategic uncertainty (Table 4). Many
economic decisions take place in contexts which require thinking about
others’ behavior and which are cognitively complex. Three coping ways
were mentioned by the vast majority of interviewees in both banks and
form a core: make others predictable directly; develop a theory of mind
of others; communicate to others or try to influence them. We [Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos] interpret these three core coping ways as suggesting
that bankers realize the importance of game-theoretic considerations,
and — going beyond theory — take actions in order to find out about
other players, including changing the rules of the game. This is a richer
and more active approach than the one found for coping with model
uncertainty, which at its core used thinking based on science and the
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construction and evaluation of verbal narratives. This is important be-
cause, as Lo (2004) has pointed out, action has been basically neglected
in standard economics and finance. Finally, in Table 5 we [Ehrig and
Katsikopoulos] summarize our [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos’] results on
model and strategic uncertainty for both the investment and central
bank." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.22).
– Table 5. From Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014, p.32).
Chapter 6: Discussion
• On page 58: Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s findings make clear the
importance of induction and abduction for coping with model uncer-
tainty.
– Many definitions and supporting conclusions of induction have
been elaborated so far. The one which better embraces the pur-
pose of Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’ work describes induction
as "inferential processes that expand knowledge in the face of un-
certainty"(Holyoak and Holland, 1989, p.1).
• On page 59: In their study, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos "refer to Peirce
(1955)’s abduction in M. Y. Abolafia (2010)’s sense, that is, in or-
der to describe how an economic model and a narrative are adapted
to each other and are integrated so as to combine the precision of a
mathematical model with the richness of a verbal discussion. Hansen
and Sargent (2008) suggest that model uncertainty be dealt with in
a technical way, by using control theory. We [Ehrig and Katsikopou-
los] did not find evidence for this or similar approaches. Instead of
developing more sophisticated technique, central bankers developed
their social cognition and organizational processes. It seems that this
approach has its niche. For example, take the financial crisis of 2007-
2008. Even in the most sophisticated DSGE models used at that time,
a financial crisis was, by construction, simply not possible. In group
discussions, however, contexts and refinements that are not included
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in models can be discussed. In sum, the construction and evaluation of
narratives may be more functional than technical approaches of coping
with model uncertainty, assuming that the different verbal explana-
tions of an economic development are checked, by many participants
with diverse backgrounds, in terms of their logic and their implica-
tions. Figuring out the conditions under which narratives are effective
in copying with model uncertainty is a key theoretical question." (Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.24).
– As suggested by Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) further "work
should be done on how different narratives and model predic-
tions are, or should be, weighted in committee decisions. We
[Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] found rudimentary answers to this
question in our [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos’s] interviews: Narra-
tives are scrutinized by challenging their logic and a successful
narrative also needs to have political appeal and enable the com-
mittee to act. It is crucial to model the process by which support
for one or another narrative accumulates (Tuckett et al., 2014)"
(p.25)
– As highlighted by Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014) "it is worth
noting that one of the ways of coping with model uncertainty we
[Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] found in line with new developments
in economic theory. Nevertheless, the effects of disagreement are
currently studied by several scholars such as Simsek (2013) and
Brunnermeier et al. (2012), the investigation of the conditions
under which disagreement has value is, to our knowledge, an
understudied topic." (p.25).
– In their study, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos "discuss strategic uncer-
tainty. In the behavioral game theory literature, a major point
of discussion is the level of reasoning of interacting players Nagel
(1995). We [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] found that bankers do
not reason deeper than Levels 2 or 3. One may tempted to see
this as a failure of rationality but it is not necessarily so. First,
bankers may be taking a bet that even at Levels 2 or 3, they
are more sophisticated than other players and thus can exploit
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them. Second, a more effective way of coping with strategic un-
certainty can be to change the rules of the game, including taking
clever actions that invite other players to reveal their thinking.
This way is sometimes available to central bankers. A theory
is badly needed that models and analyses the tradeoffs between
these two ways of coping. We [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] also
found evidence that bankers often think about others’ relative
sophistication and develop a theory of mind of others. A theory
of mind of another player can be developed by thinking about
the breadth of this player’s thinking or by reasoning through a
situation using that player’s putative assumptions. These coping
ways can be studied theoretically by using epistemic game the-
ory Brandenburger (2007) and games with unawareness Heifetz
et al. (2013). Finally, our [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos’s] findings
on strategic uncertainty have implications for the questionably
strong assumptions underlying no-trade theorems of economics
and the efficient financial markets hypothesis. For example, if I
believe that another agent will buy an asset at a higher price in
the future, I will buy today to have the option to sell to this other
agent later even if I believe that the asset is already overvalued
today (Xiong Yan, 2010). In such situations, I may not even need
to form any beliefs about fundamental values. It is sufficient to
form a higher order belief about other agents’ beliefs and their
likely reactions in the near future since these beliefs and reactions
will drive prices in the short run. We [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos]
found that investment bankers developed sophisticated ways of
reading information off prices that feeds into higher order be-
liefs. Indeed, investors such as George Soros claim that they were
hugely successful by predicting belief dynamics of others (Soros,
2010). An interesting question is whether strong and persistent
individual differences do exist." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014,
p.24).
Chapter 7: General Conclusions
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• On page 68: In their study, "Starting from the obvious fact that cog-
nition under uncertainty cannot always be reduced to thinking about
risk, probability and games, we [Ehrig and Katsikopoulos] investigated
empirically the ways in which practitioners cope with uncertainty."
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.23).
– The primary objective of Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study
consists in determining whether bankers develop a multitude of
ways of coping with uncertainty that go beyond probabilistic rea-
soning. The two authors show that bankers use different ways to
cope with uncertainty including a scientific approach, narratives,
analogies, risk management, disagreement acknowledgement.
– The second main object of Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s
study consists in determine whether bankers use different tools
adaptively, "trying to pick up the right tool for the right job"
(Ehrig and Katsikopoulos, 2014, p.23).
• On page 69: "In sum, Ehrig and Katsikopoulos (2014)’s study clearly
suggests that a multi-disciplinary approach needs to be taken in order
to understand the cognition of bankers under uncertainty. Our [Ehrig
and Katsikopoulos’s] hope is that our empirical findings will be used for
the building of sound and relevant theory." (Ehrig and Katsikopoulos,
2014, p.26).
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